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ARTICLE
THE EXPANDING PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE:
A WARNING TO ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND
POLICY MAKERS
Geoffrey R. Scott*
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more
nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words
mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master
- that's all."'
INTRODUCTION
The protracted life of the evolving beast of the law is some-
times lost as advocates strain to harness it to their daily work. So,
too, are the myriad philosophies blurred that in compromise
have contributed to its birth. Instead, we may, at times, stand in
awe of its forceful visage. On other occasions, we may focus
upon the obvious features with which we have grown most famil-
iar and become blinded to the whole figure. In still other situa-
tions we are no less than fully ignorant of its inner character. In
this context, it can be forgotten that legal decisions are often be-
gotten of political and social struggle. 2 As a consequence and to
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Penn-
sylvania State University. The author wishes to thank Karen E. Maull,
Esq., for her assistance, patience and insight.
1. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLAss AND WHAT ALICE
FOUND THERE 124 (1930).
2. HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 180-82 (Frederick Pollock ed. 1930)
(stating that "The movement of progressive societies has been progres-
sive in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by
the gradual dissolution of family dependency, and the growth of indi-
vidual obligation in its place. The individual is steadily substituted for
the Family, as the unit of which civil law takes account .... The word
status may be employed to construct a formula expressing the law of
progress thus indicated, which, whatever be its value, seems to me to
be sufficiently ascertained. All the forms of Status taken notice of in
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the essential exclusion of a healthy perspective, we sometimes
erect a false icon of critical analysis and cling steadfastly to the
mere mechanics of legal decision making. In particular, as we
work zealously at the perimeter of the structure, we sometimes
fail to comprehend that the fabric is incomplete or that the sin-
gle threads are weak. As a result, missteps are taken and mistakes
are made. The result can be a misshapen and ill fitting garment.
This Article intends to call attention to the irregular and halting
growth of law through the example of the public trust doctrine
the Law of persons were derived from, and to some extent are still col-
oured by, the powers and privileges anciently residing in the Family. If
then we employ Status, agreeably with the usage of the best writers, to
signify these personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to
such conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement,
we may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto
been a movement from Status to Contract."). Cf Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (acknowledging certain due process rights as flowing
from the status of participating in certain entitlement programs); Pugh
v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979) (allocating rights on the basis of
the status of being a tenant); see also Charles Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L. J. 733 (1964). Other commentators have also stated:
It might be suggested that evolving policy perspectives and
changing themes in distributive justice propel law into an ad
infinitum cyclical pattern of status to contract to status and
so on: In the market economy, the distribution of income is
determined by the sale of factor services. It thus depends
upon the distribution of factor endowments. With regard to
labor income, this distribution involves the distribution of
abilities to earn such income, as well as the desire to do so.
With regard to capital income, it involves the distribution of
wealth as determined by inheritance, marriage patterns, and
lifetime savings. The distribution of labor and capital endow-
ments is linked by investment in education, which in turn af-
fects the wage rate, which a person can command.
Given the distribution of endowments, the distribution on in-
come depends upon factor prices. In a competitive market,
these prices equal the value of the factor's marginal product.
In many instances, however, returns are determined in im-
perfect markets where institutional factors, such as conven-
tional salary structures, family connections, social status, sex,
race, and so forth, play a significant role.
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 82-83 (2d ed. 1976).
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and to relate it to certain other dynamic ideals within the
broader legal process to which it is ideologically bound. In this
regard, this Article is intended to serve as a cautionary warning
to environmentalists and others who have come to view the prin-
ciples of law as sterile tools designed solely to yield a harvest of
anointed self-interested goals.
Section I of this Article will present an overview of the public
trust doctrine and speculate upon the competing social phenom-
ena that have been a catalyst to its precipitation. It will also note
certain of the purportedly mistaken judicial judgments that have
been made concerning the history of the public trust that may
have led to an improper development of the doctrine. Section II
will briefly review the decisions of two coastal states, Delaware
and New Jersey, to demonstrate that different views have been
taken of this single doctrine. Section III will evaluate the solidity
of the doctrine in the context of the seething cauldron of select
and recent takings decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. Special attention will be given to the views of Justice
Scalia as the author of the Court's opinion in the germinal case
of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.3 Sections IV and V will
place the public trust doctrine in the larger context of the
broader constitutional debate concerning stare decisis and retroac-
tivity. This Section will take particular note of the relevant views
of select individual justices in order to sensitize readers to the
potential organic vulnerability of such principles as the public
trust.
I. THE PUBLIC TRUST
A. The Broader Jurisprudential Conundrum
The public trust doctrine has been heralded by environmental
activists as a valuable weapon in the fight to preserve the earth's
resources in a natural state and to make their enjoyment more
readily accessible to the populus at large.4 While the seminal
3. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992).
4. JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS (1994); PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE TO WORK. THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO
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principles from which the doctrine is derived purport to date to
ancient Greece and Rome and have found a seemingly respected
place in the historical jurisprudence of Britain and the United
States, it has only been in the last several decades that the doc-
trine has been employed to assertively readjust notions of the
private and public interests in property. The reincarnation of the
tool and its manipulation in the service of more general goals
may owe credit to the land use control perspectives surrounding
such activities as integrated coastal zone management and wet-
land preservation. To these ends, advocates' voices have stimu-
lated some judicial and legislative minds to declaring that certain
property is of its greatest positive value when left in its natural
state, and in that condition it should belong, forever, to the
public.5
Within the context of the ongoing debate, however, the use of
the doctrine has been perceived as innovative by some, yet de-
structive of the basic fabric of the property law by others.6 The
shift in attention that has apparently occasioned the current
strife is the vision of the figure of law bending to hear the voices
of those immersed in a Darwinian competition for the earth's
limited resources. As is perhaps predictable, the scene is set to
portray judicial and legislative attention being sought by those
who want what is believed by others to be properly theirs.
The underlying dramatic tension is a consequence of the clash
of the fundamental vehicles of distributive preference. 7 Each calls
upon a naively presumptive view that law should provide a rem-
THE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WATERS AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE
COASTAL STATES (David C. Slade ed., 1990). See also Joseph L. Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 Mich. L. Rev. 472 (1970).
5. Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession Against the States: The Horn-
books Have It Wrong, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 939 (1996) (noting the
transformational preference).
6. See, e.g., infra Section II.
7. F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 29 (1985), noting that
property law has not been static but that "the tension between public
and private property rights was continuous, ever subject to a gradual
drift in favor of one at the expense of the other." See also Douglas W.
Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor
Obtuse, 1988 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1639.
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edy for every wrong, and that thus posited individual interests
should be vindicated. In this regard, some hold steadfastly to an
illusion of certainty that has been generated as society has
strived, through law, for relative stability and predictability in the
affairs of people. They are challenged by the claimed socio-
centric (or competitive egocentric) desires of others who appeal
to a general justifying aim that may be founded upon a
centrifugal or egalitarian view of interests. The latter proponents
proffer that their preferences are necessary, noble and superior,
and as a consequence, are to be spontaneously transformed into
a system of cognizable a priori rights.8
As may be anticipated, the competing and sometimes amor-
phous preferences are found on all sides of the controversy. Now
may be a propitious time to reexamine them more closely. For
purposes of discussion, it might, perhaps, be advantageous to
characterize the controversy as an exercise in the familiar strug-
gle between act and rule utilitarianism. It could be recast to in-
quire as to whether it is proper for a civilized polity to abide by a
rule so as to inculcate the value of the predictability and reliabil-
ity of legal results, or might we ask whether it is better to discard
the rule in order to achieve what may, at least appear to the ac-
tors to be a more reasonable transactional result.
The specific issues being raised are truly quite elementary. Is
one to conclude that, short of the use of personal physical force,
there is no worldly ownership without political recognition and
service, that such recognition will exist only when private owner-
ship best serves the interest of government extant, and that it
will be limited when privatization exceeds what is episodically
deemed to be reasonable social bounds? Do constraints
grounded in nuisance, restrictions in land use and the availability
of eminent domain bespeak of the residual public interest?9 On
8. The complement of public and private interests in property is
discussed in Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of Takings Ju-
risprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1892 (1992). See also Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) ("In general it is not plain that a
man's misfortunes or necessities will justify his shifting the damages to
his neighbor's shoulders.").
9. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992). See also Lunney, supra note 8; William M. Treanor, The Original
1998]
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the other side of the table, however, is there an essential inher-
ent right to exclude others from the use of property that is
grounded in a need for individuality, solitude, privacy or con-
trol,10 or might the concept of private property be required to
exist to support a market economy whose function might be
compromised without the ability to transfer exclusive ownership
to a purchaser for a fee? 1 Do constitutional provisions that re-
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 782 (1995).
10. Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 384 (1994), identified the right to exclude others as of singu-
lar importance in the law of private property: "[P]ublic access would
deprive petitioner of the right to exclude others, 'one of the most es-
sential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property' " (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979)). Blackstone in his commentaries noted that property was essen-
tially a claim "over the external things of the world, in total exclusion
of the right of any other individual in the universe." 2 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 2.
Medieval economy with its constant regard to the relations of
persons was giving place to modern economy which treats the
exchange of things as fundamental; and this has introduced an
extraordinary simplification in the structure of society; the
whole of the complicated industrial organisations of the mid-
dle ages have passed away, and the strong esprit-de-corps,
which gave so much healthy life in many cities, has also dis-
appeared. Economically, we have only three broad divisions
in society, for men arrange themselves according to the
things they own and exchange; they may exchange their la-
bour for wages, or they may exchange the use of their capi-
tal for interest, or they may exchange the use of their land
for rent. In modern societies Labourers, Capitalists and
Landlords are the three classes which group themselves
round the possession of the power to labour, the possession
of wealth, and the possession of land. This is the social struc-
ture we habitually assume, but it is strangely unlike the mu-
nicipal and manorial life it has superceded.
WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COM-
MERCE DURING THE EARLY AND MIDDLE AGES 464-65 (5th ed. 1910) (cita-
tions omitted).
11. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 2, at 50-51 ("The market
can function only in a situation where the 'exclusion principle' applies,
i.e., where A's consumption is made contingent on his paying the
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strain government control over land echo one or the other of
these propriettry themes? In sum, these and other related issues
have long been a part of the structure of the myth of property,
but one that is often shrouded from view so that a modicum of
daily order ,can dominate.
If one takes pause, law in its grander (and perhaps more prag-
matic) view need not be so adversarial. Notwithstanding what
might have become a lawyer's popular conception of law as an
edifice built upon continuing conflict and consequent resolution,
the law may (or should be) perceived as a system of intelligent
accommodation. From this perspective, order may be dependent
upon an evanescent balance of authority and power, and rely for
its longevity upon an induced voluntary acceptance of and com-
pliance with the terms of basic agreements by the participants.12
Perhaps as in a good and healthy family, there may be disagree-
ments but there are also reliable relationships that do not re-
quire constant vigilance. Also like a family, a polity may grow
when one of its number comes upon a new interest and presses
it upon the group. While the homeostasis is certainly disturbed
and the routine environment is altered and becomes more dy-
namic, the fundamental architectonics remain.
Similarly, the application of property law may not merely be
the invocation of a manifest and sterile set of rules. Some rules,
like the Dead Sea Scrolls, were mislaid long ago and have only
recently been recovered. Rather, it is the adjustment of the vary-
ing ambitions and philosophies of the elemental constituents
through the considered response of the functional and organiz-
price, while B, who does not pay, is excluded. Exchange cannot occur
without property rights and property rights require exclusion. Given
such exclusion, the market can function as an auction system. The con-
sumer must bid for the .product, thereby revealing preferences to the
producer, and the producer, under the pressures of competition, is
guided by such signals to produce what the consumers want. At least,
such is the outcome with a well-functioning market.").
12. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL & ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCI-
ETY A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL INQUIRY (1950). See also HAROLD D.
LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES (1971); HAROLD D. LASSWELL,
POLITICS WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (reprinted by Peter Smith
1950).
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ing social features of the polity. 13
B. The Social Interest - Do The Ends Justify The Means?
It may be that within the notion of ownership a socio-political
policy developed that permitted property to be withdrawn from
the communal cauldron, placed into the stream of commerce by
an individual's hand, transformed into private value so that all
could indirectly benefit from it.' 4 This trend could logically have
been acceptable when a state possessed a relative abundance of
resources and was driven by a nascent desire to grow strong by
using the energies of goal-oriented community members. As gen-
eral paradigms of this premise, one might reference the princi-
ples of capture in natural resource allocation 5 and the produc-
13. There are a number of outstanding works that address these
phenomena in the context of property and the takings issue. They in-
clude: Kmiec, supra note 7; Lunney, supra note 8; Frank I. Michelman,
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensa-
tion" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Joseph Sax, Takings and the Po-
lice Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36 (1964); Treanor, supra note 9.
14. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 289 (Peter Laslett
ed. 1988) ("The labour that was mine, . . . hath fixed my Prop-
erty . . . ."). See also Latovick, supra note 5; MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE,
supra note 2, at 85 ("Natural law philosophers such as Hobbes and
Locke, following what are here referred to as endowment-based crite-
ria, postulated a person's innate right to the fruits of his efforts,
thereby giving ethical support to distribution by factor endowment and
the pricing of factors in the market.").
15. See Louisiana v. United States, 832 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1987)
(discussing how the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301, altered
the allocation of rights in oil and gas (43 U.S.C. § 1337 (g)) and not-
ing the common law principles of capture). See also Geer v. Connecti-
cut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (presenting an excellent historical and policy
review of the development of the theory of capture, including its rela-
tionship to the public trust doctrine, in the context of reviewing a
game control statute that restricted the taking and transportation be-
yond state limits of certain birds); State of LA. Ex Rel. Guste v. M/V
Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1039 (5th Cir. 1985) (dissent discussing the
principle of capture in the context of fishing); J. M. Young v. Ethyl
Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975) (discussing the common law rule of
capture in the context of fugacious minerals); Midwestern Gas Trans-
mission Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 292 F.2d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1961)
[Vol. X
THE EXPANDING PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
tivity requirement of the doctrine of adverse possession. 16
Under other circumstances, however, there may have been a
deficiency in allocative pressure. Some examples include: (i) the
state of a competitor's knowledge of an item and its uses; (ii) an
underdeveloped recognition of immediate personal need; or (iii)
a perceived undesirability or inability to exploit the item after
considering the possible failure of available technologies to spark
competitive awareness. Since the element was not prized by the
community, a perceived need to constrain otherwise free individ-
ual access to and use of it may not have existed.
Community perceptions may also factor into the equation.
There was a time when wetlands were viewed as a nuisance and a
breeding ground for vermin. Harbors, docks and bays were used
as the open sewers of developing settlements. Wharves, ware-
houses and bars were the places where longshoreman and sailors
worked and caroused. The gentile, the uninformed or the com-
plaisant may have been content to give such places wide berth
and to leave the attendant resources of such locations to the de-
(concurring opinion noting: "I still believe that Congress was equally
concerned with the rights, the ownership and the imperative require-
ment for fairness due those who own this valuable natural resource,
those whose ingenuity and risktaking captures it for man's productive
use, and those who transport it from the wellhead to the burner tip.");
Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. Supp. 159, 161-62 (D. Mass. 1881) (noting the princi-
ple of capture as used in the fin-back whaling industry); Nixon v.
United States, 978 E2d 1269, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (describing various
means by which property may be acquired and noting: "While the pre-
cise contours of the term 'property' are not well delineated, it is settled
law that the Constitution does not create property interests. Rather,
'property' is a creature of independent origins.").
16. See Alaska Nat'l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Ala. 1977);
Finley v. Yuiba County Water Dist., 99 Cal. App. 3d 691, 696-7, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 423, 427 (1979); Doyle v. Hicks, 78 Wash. App. 538, 541, 897 P.2d
420, 422 (1995); RICHARD R. POWELL, 7 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1012
(Patrick Rohan, ed. 1992, rev. 1993); C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION
91-94 (1961); Paul N. Bowles, Adverse Possession of Subsurface Materials, 71
Ky. LJ. 83 (1983); Latovick, supra note 5, at 941-42 (1996) (referencing
the transmutational land issue); John G. Sprankling, An Environmental
Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 820 n.11-13 (1994)
(containing a list of cases referencing the policy); William B. Stoebuck,
The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WASH. L. REv. 53 (1960).
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vices of others.1 7 Later, however, when the visions of a few stimu-
17. See Elizabeth B. Anderson, Annapolis, A walk into History
(1984) (noting that there was no plumbing in Annapolis until 1870 and
that people used wells placed along public streets for bathing and the
gathering of water; "Baltimore had no underground sewer system or
sewage treatment facility until 1909. Human waste was channeled into
cesspools that often leaked into the ground water that flowed into the
city's drinking wells. Other waste flowed through the streets in open
sewers, making its way slowly to local streams and rivers . . . . Disease
could spread rapidly because of the unsanitary water supply and the
overcrowded conditions. Baltimore's smallpox epidemic of 1882-83
killed 1,184 people, most of whom lived in low-lying densely populated
areas . . ... "). See also SUZANNE ELLERY GREENE CHAPELLE ET AL., MARY-
LAND, A HISTORY OF ITS PEOPLE 186 (Johns Hopkins University Press
1986); KEVIN FLEMING, ANNAPOLIS (1988) (noting that the waterfront in
Annapolis and environs was shunned as dirty even into the 1960's:
Those who put so much value on waterfront property today
might be surprised to learn that one time Spa Creek was a
less desirable address. Bobby Campbell explains, The City
Dock was a great cesspool. The Sewer lines went down to the
end of every street, and they dumped into Spa Creek, in Sev-
ern River, in Back Creek, all sewer lines, all the sewage.
When we would swim, we'd just take our arm and move the
stuff out of the way. We called them blind eels. We'd move
the blind eels out of the way. Talk about ecology. The ale-
wives would come and feed on the sewage. The bluefish
would come up and feed on the alewives. We'd go down and
catch the bluefish and bring them home and fry them and
eat them. So that's the ecology. And I'm still here.
Mame Warren, Then Again ... Annapolis, 1900-1965 xii (Time Ex-
posure Ltd. 1990); MARION E. WARREN, BRING BACK THE BAY 99 (1994)
(stating that "few people who live on the Susquehanna - or on the Po-
tomac or the James River - realize how much the water they're near
contributes to the Chesapeake Bay. Oh, they know it flows there even-
tually, but they don't think about the waste they throw overboard - or
any sewage or industrial contamination'- which ends up in the Chesa-
peake Bay."); Interview with Alicia Parker, historian for the Historic
Annapolis Foundation (October 14, 1997) (observing the changing atti-
tudes of persons who lived by the water. She noted that homes on the
rivers and Bay were reconfigured, over time, to reflect the greater or
lesser importance of a water site. For example, simple identification of
the single water side of a structure changed from front to rear or rear
to front depending upon the prevalent social convention. Interview of
October 14, 1997. In addition, the Maryland State Archive Center in
[Vol. X
THE EXPANDING PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
lated an initiative to "clean up" these areas or convert depressed
or abandoned properties into serviceable and tax paying units;
.the community may have encouraged "clean up" efforts to ob-
tain ancillary, externalized and immediate benefits in the form
of a reduced threats and costs of crime, or at the least, the
abatement of an offending eyesore.18 This would have been par-
ticularly attractive if the collective was not asked to contribute fi-
nancially to the project.
From a social dynamic point of view, might it have been that
beach and marsh areas were viewed as ravaged by elements too
harsh to economically permit the improvement or maintenance
of properties? Or perhaps, many factors came together to lead to
the customary decision that shore settlement was not propi-
tious. 19 The scarcity of fresh water, the need of seamen to live
close to their vocations, the difficulty of traveling to these lo-
cales, and a distribution of wealth inadequate to support ex-
panded leisure choice may all have contributed to this
conclusion.
Eventually, however, innovation in travel and advances in con-
struction materials and techniques and the advent of certain gov-
ernment subsidies2 . made it possible to liberate the otherwise
Annapolis has numerous diaries, notes and photographs noting the
changing social perspectives).
18. See MAME WARREN, supra note 17 at XIV ("By the late 1930's,
some enterprising local businessmen had begun to explore the possibil-
ity of developing Annapolis as a Yachting center. Over the ensuing
years, a subtle, but ultimately dramatic, evolution took place in An-
napolitans' perspectives of the Bay. By the 1950's and 1960's, more re-
sidents began to view the water not as a source of sustenance, but as a
source of pleasure."). See also KEVIN FLEMING ET AL., OCEAN CITY, MARY-
LAND'S GRAND OLD RESORT viii (Portfolio Press 1990) (documenting the
social changes following World War II that occasioned the growth of
the recreation industry in Ocean City).
19. See G. Carleton Ray & William P. Gregg, Jr., Establishing Bio-
sphere Reserves for Coastal Barrier Ecosystems, 41 BIOSCIENCE 301 (1991)
(noting that "[h]arsh physical conditions, such as storms and unstable
substrates, limited the development of early settlements on coastal
barriers.").
20. The federal government's role in subsidizing coastal develop-
ment programs such as roads, bridges, and utilities combined with gov-
ernment programs supporting economic development planning, beach
1998]
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captive value of these resources. Further, the needs and goals of
the group seemed to change. Available riches or more egalita-
rian dreams altered the acceptable view of leisure time. The nu-
clear family and neighborhood group diminished in value when
compared to the call of job opportunity.2 1 As a consequence, the
erosion control, hurricane protection, navigation works, flood insur-
ance, housing mortgage guarantees and disaster relief have contributed
to growth in the vulnerable coastal zone. See id. at 301 (explaining that
"intensive development of coastal barriers began first in parts of the
Northeast early in 1900s, and eventually extended to the most remote
areas during the 1960s and 1970s. This development has been made
possible by the coastal barriers' exceptional recreational amenities, the
proximity of urban centers, sophisticated engineering capabilities, and
a growing number of corporate and individual investors."). See also
John R. Clark, Management of Coastal Barrier Biosphere Reserves, 41 Bios-
CIENCE 331 (May 1991) (Federal subsidies have played an especially im-
portant role in the development of coastal barriers. "The Interior De-
partment reported that federal subsidies greatly contributed to the
explosion of coastal growth. One of the granddaddy subsidies is the
National Flood Insurance Program, which was created in 1968 to do, in
part, precisely what it has failed to do: encourage coastal communities
to guide development away from the water's edge. But roughly three-
quarters of the program's 2.5 million policies insure coastal develop-
ment"); Beth Millemann, Our Taxes Shouldn't Wash Away, NEWSDAY, Jan
13, 1993, at 89; US Department of the Interior, Final environmental im-
pact statement: undeveloped coastal barriers, USDI IV-37 (1983).
21. Discussion with Dr. Orrin Pilkey, Professor of Geology at Duke
University and an expert on coastal ecology issues, particularly on the
Outer Banks of North Carolina (December 22, 1997) (Opining that the
dominant reason for the change in social perspective with respect to
coastal use is economic and relates to individuals possessing increased
disposable income. He concludes that the risk assumption reflected in
beach use demonstrates a contempt by the public for natural re-
sources.); see also ROBERT DITTON, ET AL., COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGE-
MENT BEYOND BUREAUCRACY AND THE MARKET 6 (Lexington Books 1977)
("Following World War II, Americans were more mobile and had more
leisure time and discretionary income. Public participation in recrea-
tion activities increased sharply as did the need for coastal park and
recreation resources. . . . The demand for coastal housing, recrea-
tional as well as permanent, was great.").
Following World War II, coastal barriers underwent rapid
and extensive residential development . . . . The causes of
this great desirability of coastal barrier real estate are due to
[Vol. X
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the changes in American lifestyles, which have resulted from
the increased affluence, mobility, and leisure time of a pro-
gressively larger part of the population. For many people,
the construction of a second home on a barrier island has
meant a comfortable place for an annual vacation, considera-
ble rental income, and various tax deductions for mortgage
interest, depreciation and sometimes inadequately insured
storm damage. In recent years, joint ownership has provided
a means for people of modest means to experience the so-
cial and recreational benefits of a home or condominium at
the beach, often through purchase of shares in a corporation
which develops and finances a project and entitles the share-
holder to occupy the unit for a specified time. The rapidly
increasing population of young, relatively affluent, single
people-the progeny of the postwar baby boom-has played
a major role in creating the growing demand for residential
development on coastal barriers, which has characterized the
last decade, particularly in the Sun Belt. In addition, a grow-
ing population of senior citizens has become ever more will-
ing to invest in retirement communities in the year-round
congenial climates of Florida and other southern states.
Many of these people are moving down from larger to
smaller homes. A recent change in the tax code which allows
senior citizens to claim a one-time exemption from capital
gains on the first $125,000 of the proceeds from the sale of a
personal residence encourages such moves. The market for
coastal barrier real estate created by theses two groups aug-
ments traditional demand.
USDI Final Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 20, at IV-39-40
(note that on May 6, 1997 Amendment to the Internal Revenue Code
has raised the exemption to $250,000 and the exemption may be
claimed for every two years of aggregate ownership use by a taxpayer
during the five year period ending on the date of sale. See IRC § 121 as
amended by P.L. 105-34; M.L. Miller, The Rise of Coastal and Marine
Tourism, OCEAN AND COASTAL MANAGEMENT 20(3) 181-199 (1993)
("Marine tourism has surfaced as a controversial topic in the field of
ocean and coastal management. Because demand for travel exhibits
greater variation and magnitude than ever in history, the tourism in-
dustry has become the largest business on earth. Ecotourism, a recent
phenomenon attuned to the ideal of sustainable development, is sug-
gested to emerge through the social construction processes of restora-
tion and enhancement."). For documentation of the degree of popula-
tion change and consequent construction see NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA), NATIONAL OCEAN SERVICE, 50
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population was not as repulsed by or complacent with the harsh
character of the locale as it had been, and people began to rec-
ognize a personal advantage in an intensified association with
the rediscovered resource. It felt that it was proper to get its
share of the appreciation, profit or benefit.22
In this context, it was likely predictable that some would posit
that they had been robbed of or tricked into giving up a valua-
ble asset that they had tamed and that they should have it back.
In opposition others, however, would claim that they were (and
are) possessed of reasonable expectations of ownership
grounded upon years of relatively undisturbed and stable experi-
ence and that they are entitled to retain their interests. It is in
YEARS OF POPULATION CHANGE ALONG THE NATION'S COASTS 1960-2010,
US Dept. of Commerce (April 1990); see also NOAA, Building Along
America's Coasts: 20 Years of Building Permits, 1970-1989, US Dept. of
Commerce (August 1992).
22. Justice Scalia acknowledged this propensity. In asserting that
the permit condition that the Nollans provide an easement along the
beach did not have the requisite nexus to a substantial government in-
terest, Scalia noted:
[U]nless the permit condition serves the same government
purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is
not a valid regulation of land use but "an out-and-out plan
of extortion" ....
One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leverag-
ing of the police power is allowed would produce stringent land-use
regulation which the State then waives to accomplish other purposes,
leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals purportedly sought
to be served than would result from more lenient (but nontradeable)
development restrictions. Thus, the importance of the purpose under-
lying the prohibition not only does not justify the imposition of unre-
lated conditions for eliminating the prohibition, but positively mili-
tates against the practice.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1987) (cita-
tions omitted); see also MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 2, at 86-88
("As distinct from supporters of these endowment-based criteria, other
social philosophers rejected innate inequality as a legitimate source of
differences in economic well-being . . . . [Another] version postulates
thaitequality of welfare is inherently desirable. Based on the humanistic
view of the equal worth of each individual, this tenet underlines the
egalitarian views of such writers as Rousseau and Marx.").
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this context that we may now turn to an examination of the vari-
ous elements of the public trust doctrine.
C. The Doctrine
1. An Elemental Overview
The basic doctrine is, in its simplest sense, nothing less than a
principle of sovereignty.23 It stipulates that for the purpose of de-
limiting a government's relationship to ownership of the earth
resources there are two classifications of property: (1) that which
is capable of transfer, in usual and ordinary course, to private
ownership; and (2) that which is not and is to be held by govern-
ment in a public trust for its constituents. 24 This appears, how-
23. See Oregon ex rel State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 372-79 (1977); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 11 (1894); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (1 How.) 212
(1845); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 366 (1842); Lost Tree Village Corp.
v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 698 So.
2d 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); City of Los Angeles v. Venice Penin-
sula Properties, 253 Cal. App. 2 Dist. 331 (1998); Fla. Const. Art. X §
11; Patrick Deveney, Jus Publicum and the Public Trust: A Historical Analy-
sis, 1 SEA GRANT L. J. 13 (1976); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note
4; Cinque Bambini Partnership. v. State, 491 So.2d 508 (Miss. 1986)
(expressing the view that the doctrine was federally created); SIR MAT-
THEW HALE, DE JURE MARIS, reprinted in STUART A. MOORE, A HISTORY OF
THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO (3d ed. 1888).
24. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 366 (1842); see also Sir Matthew
Hale, De Jure Maris (lST DRAFT); Caput Secundum, Concerning the
Several Interests in the Ports of the Kingdom as reproduced in MOORE,
supra note 23, at 318 ("There is a threefold interest in the ports of the
kingdom: i. Jus regium or prerogative, ii. Jus publicum, iii. Jus
Privatum." The jus publicum in Hale's view is solely an interest in navi-
gation a public right to have navigable rivers and ports of the kingdom
free of nuisances); Deveney, supra note 23, at 46 ("[T]he people have a
publick interest, jus publicum, of passage and repassage with their
goods by water, and must not be obstructed by nuisances or impeached
by exactions .... [F] or the jus privatum of the owner or proprietor is
charged with and subject to that jus publicum which belongs to the
king's subjects, as the soil of an highway is, which though in point of
property it may be a private man's freehold, yet it is charged with a
publick interest of the people. ). DE JURE MARis, supra note 23, at
336.
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ever, to be the point at which agreement ends.
As to the form of property that is covered by the doctrine,
some opine that it is limited to intertidal lands or those flowed
by the tide.25 Of those expressing this view, the landward limit
has variously been that line defined with reference to the low
water mark,26 the ordinary low watermark,2 the winter tide,28 the
25. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261
(1997); see also Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Murphy v. Dept. of Nat. Resources,
837 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Lloyd Enters. v. Dep't. of Revenue,
651 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1995); Opinion of Justices, 649 A.2d 604 (N.H.
1994); Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991); Int'l. Paper Co. v.
Miss. State Highway Dep't., 271 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1972); Long Beach v.
Mansell, 476 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1970) (the area remains subject to the pub-
lic trust even if it is later filled); but see, Berkeley v. Super. Ct. of Ala-
meda County, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980); Slade, supra note 4, at 44 n.58
(suggesting that all states with tidelands employ some interpretation of
the ebb and flow of the tide in identifying property subject to the pub-
lic trust).
The next evidence of the king's right and propriety in the
sea and the arms thereof is his right of propriety to
The Shore; and
The Maritima Incrementa. (I.) The shore is that ground
that is between the ordinary high-water mark and low-water
mark. This doth prima facie and of common right belong to
the king, both in the shore of the sea and the shore of the
arms of the sea .... 1. For the first of these it is certain, that
that which the sea overflows, either at high-spring tides or at
extraordinary tides, comes not to this purpose under denom-
ination of littus maris; and consequently, the king's title is
not of that large extent, but only to land that is usually over-
flowed at ordinary tides.... 3.... Although it is true, that
such shore may be and commonly is parcel of the manor ad-
jacent, or so may be belonging to a subject, as shall be
shewn, yet prima facie it is the king's. And as the shore of
the sea doth prima facie belong to the king, between the or-
dinary high-water and low-water mark, so the shore of an
arm of the sea between the high-water and low-water mark
belongs prima facie to the king, though it may also belong
to a subject ....
LoRD CHIEF JUSTICE HALE, A TREATISE DE JURE MARIS ET BRACHIORUM
EJUSDEM (1786), as reproduced in Moore, supra note 23, at 377-79.
26. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604 (N.H.
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neap tide, 29 the highest tide, 30 the vegetation line, 31 or frequently,
1994) (Public use of Coastal Beaches); Groves v. Secretary of the Dep't.
of Natural Resources, No. 92A-10-003, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 80, 1994
WL 89804 (Del. Super. Feb. 8, 1994); Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d
168 (Me. 1989); Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 294 S.E.2d 866 (Va.
1982); Opinion of Justices to Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1099 (Mass.
1981); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356
(Mass. 1979); State v. Cockrell, 162 So. 2d 361 (La. 1964); Shaffer v.
Baylor's Lake Ass'n., 141 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1958); Lakeman v. Burnham, 73
Mass. 437 (1856); Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384
(1847).
27. See, e.g., Gardner v. Greer, 271 N.W. 775, 781 (N.D. 1937) (stat-
ing low water mark is the shoreline); Slauson v. Goodrich Transp. Co.,
69 N.W. 990, 992 (Wis. 1897) (stating that the low water mark is the
boundary at which the waters of a lake stands when free of disturbing
causes); In re York Haven Water and Power Co., 62 A. 97, 98 (Pa. 1905)
(stating that the boundary line on navigable rivers is at the low-water
mark).
28. See In re Walter Foss Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 773 (Haw. 1977)
("The law of general application in Hawaii is that beachfront titles run
along the upper annual reaches of the waves, excluding storms and
tidal waves .... In the instant case, after extensive testimony the land
court determined that a certain line, the 'Edge of Vegetation and Deb-
ris Line' . . . represents the 'upper reaches of the wash of the waves'
during ordinary high tide during the winter season, when the . . .
waves are further mauka (or inland) than the highest wash of waves
during the summer season." The case further states that there can be
no reliance in Hawaii due to its legal history with respect to property).
See also Dep't of Natural Resources v. Mayor & Council of Ocean City,
332 A.2d 630, 637 (Md. 1975).
29. See County of Lake v. Smith, 278 Cal. Rptr. 809, 817 (1991) A
neap tide is a tide with a small range that occurs at the first and third
quarters of the moon. "The Wm. Kent court . . . rejected the theory
that seasonal variation in the water line along tidal waters should cause
the boundary to shift back and forth, and instead directed the trial
court to fix the boundary line based upon the records of the average
of all neap tides."); see also NJ. Sports and Exposition Auth. v. McCrane,
292 A.2d 580, 616 (NJ. Super. 1971) ("The high water line or mark is
the line formed by the intersection of the tidal plane of mean high
tide with the shore. The mean (sometimes called the 'ordinary') high
tide is defined as the medium between the spring and the neap
tides."); Boone v. Kingsbury, 273 P. 797, 815 (Cal. 1928).
30. See Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 608 (N.H. 1994)
(stating that the public trust in tidewaters extends to the high water
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,the mean high water mark.32 Notwithstanding the standard that
mark).
31. See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 454 (Or.
1993); see also Matthews v. Bayhead Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355,
358 n.1 (N.J. 1984); In re Walter Foss Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 774 (Haw.
1977) (the vegetation line is frequently employed as the landward
boundary by states that include the dry sand area within the public
trust). See also Cooper v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 833, 835-36
(E.D.N.C. 1991) (if an intertidal area is filled through a public project
effort the resulting dry sand area becomes part of public trust lands).
32. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988);
see also Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 608 (N.H. 1994); 101
Ranch v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 1005 (D.N.D. 1988) (ordinary high
water mark); Idaho Forest Indus. v. Hayden, 733 P.2d 733, 737 (Idaho
1987) (natural high water mark); State ex. rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d
1093 (Idaho 1979) (ordinary mean high water mark); McNally v. Zon-
ing Comm. of Norwalk, 621 A.2d 279 (Conn. 1993); Opinion of the
Justices, 424 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass. 1981) (natural high water mark); Bos-
ton Waterfront Dev. Corp. 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979) (the lesser of
100 rods or mean high water mark).
We acknowledge that the high watermark should be "ordi-
nary" and should not represent the level reached by water in
unusual floods .... The traditional method of ascertaining
the high watermark in tidal waters is of little help. The
height of the tides is determined primarily by the gravita-
tional effects of the sun and the moon; these effects run one
complete cycle every 18.6 years. The high tide is generally
computed by averaging the high tides occurring over such a
period of time. This method is inconsistent with prescriptive
rights obtained during a five-year period of time. Moreover,
nontidal waters generally, and waters impounded behind a
dam in particular, know of no tidal rhythmic regularity...
Thus the 18.6-year average is of little utility. Averaging the
high watermarks set over a larger number of years is also in-
consistent with the theory of prescriptive rights. . . . Plain-
tiffs propose the method traditionally used in free-flowing
rivers. The high watermark is defined as the place where the
riverbed ends and the riverbank begins. This method in-
volves examining the riverbank to find the highest point
where the water's flows have prevented the growth of vegeta-
tion. This method is premised on the assumption that the
river will, over a period of time, predictably return to a cer-
tain level where it will leave an indelible mark upon its
banks. This method is unacceptable for several reasons. First,
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is selected, however, there is no general consensus on the spe-
cific period of time over which the measurement is to be made.33
The duration has been one year, nineteen years, twenty-three
years or just a long enough time to satisfy a particular court.3 4
Others have concluded that the principle encompasses any pub-
lic resource in which the community has a special interest.35 This
has included submerged lands,3 6 land over which flows navigable
resort to the physical characteristics of the riverbank is a
method of ascertaining the historical levels of water where
more accurate measurements are unavailable. Here we have
data accurate to two decimal points. . . . We conclude the
,vegetation test,' like the mathematical averaging test, is un-
suitable for present purposes.
Fogerty v. California, 231 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (1986) (citations omitted).
See also De Jure Maris Cap. VI, supra note 23, which describes the iden-
tification of shores, discusses high and low tides, spring tides, ordinary
and neap tides, reviews the means by which acquisition may be had, in-
cluding custom and prescription, and considers the possibility of pri-
vate ownership of the various areas.
33. See Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604 (Public Use of
Coastal Beaches) (N.H. 1994) (not finding an answer to the question
of how to establish the line); see also South Dakota Wildlife Fed. v.
Water Management Bd., 382 N.W.2d 26 (S.D. 1986).
34. See United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997) (19 years); see also
United States v. California, 382 U.S. 448, 449-50 (1966) (18.7 years); Bo-
rax Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935) (measured over a
considerable length of time; also speaks in terms of the tide as general,
usual or normal); South Pac. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 144 E 160
(N.D. Cal. 1906); Fogerty v. California, 231 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (1996)
(18.6 years or "enough" time; rejects mathematical and vegetation line
tests for rivers); Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr.
191 (1982) (measured over a long period of time). See also Gwathney v.
State, 464 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 1995) (the lunar tide test is not applicable
in North Carolina).
35. See D.C. v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. 1984); but see,
Larson v. Sands, 508 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1993) (public not entitled to
land above the intertidal zone.)
36. See United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975); see also Martin
v. Waddell, 41 U.S. at 416; Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489 (9th
Cir. 1991) (the public trust includes all submerged lands and the sea-
shore so long as the waters are navigable); Capune v. Robbins, 160
S.E.2d 881 (N.C. 1968); King v. Oahu Ry & Land Co., 11 Haw. 717
(1899); cf. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301.
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water (fresh or salt), 3v dry sand beaches,3 8 public parks or any
land that possesses attributes in which the public has a found
value.39
The purposes that support the delimitation of this unusual
species of property have historically been identified as serving
the fundamental public needs of vocational navigation, fishing
and commerce. 40 In more contemporary environs the reasons for
subjecting property to the doctrine include sunbathing,
beachcombing, walking, aesthetic enjoyment, recreation, and a
myriad of other forms of pure avocational activity.41
37. See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 489; see also Alaska v. United
States, 662 F. Supp. 455, 459 (Alaska 1987); Gianoli v. Fleiderer, 563
N.W.2d 562 (Wis. 1997); State v. Central Vermont Ry, 571 A.2d 1128
(Vt. 1989); Bott v. Comm'r, 327 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. 1982) (addresses in-
land waters; applies a floating log test to ascertain if a stream is naviga-
ble and notes that it is essentially a commercial use test; stated that the
balance to be struck between competing interests should be done by
the legislature and not the courts, and that the legislature should pro-
vide compensation lest there by a taking). See also Kaiser Aetna v.
United States 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (discussing the scope of the fed-
eral navigational servitude and noting that not all navigable waters are
subject to servitude). Cf National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of
Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (noting that public trust in
California can include non-navigable waters as well).
38. See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (an excellent case
for developing the competing views of the limits of the public trust).
39. See Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. 1984) (a conserva-
tion area); see also Paepche v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 263
N.E.2d 11 (111. 1970) (a park).
40. See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 476. See also Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (stating that public lands
were held in trust for the people of the state so that they might enjoy
the navigation of waters, carry on commerce, and fish therein); Ow-
sichek v. State Guide Bd., 763 P.2d 488 (Ala. 1988).
41. See Friends of Hatteras Island v. Coastal Resources Comm'n of
N.C., 452 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. 1995); see also Hayes v. A.J. Assocs. Inc., 846
P.2d 131 (Ala. 1993); Klingeisen v. State Dep't of Natural Resources,
472 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. 1991) (scenic beauty); Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v.
Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement Dist., 733 P.2d 733 (Idaho 1987)
(aesthetic beauty); City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County,
606 P.2d 362, 369 (Cal. 1980) (environmental needs). But see Gianoli v.
Pfleiderer, 563 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. 1997) (public trust does not include
beach-combing or walking of dogs); Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168
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The government may gain possession of land through a variety
of means. These include conquest,42 discovery, 43 succession to the
rights of a prior government or the sovereign population, 44 dedi-
cation, 45 prescriptive easement,46 custom 47 or as the res of an ex-
(Me. 1989) (public trust not to be expanded beyond fishing, fowling or
navigation); Bott v. Comm'n of Natural Resources, 327 N.W.2d 838
(Mich. 1982) (public trust does not include hunting or trapping).
42. See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 457. See also Hyman v.
State Lands of California, 543 F. Supp. 118 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (acquisi-
tion under treaty); Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 282 P.2d 481 (Cal.
1955) (revocation of a trust).
43. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
44. See North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. v. Andrus, 671 F2d 271
(8th Cir. 1982).
45. See Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.
1964); see also Dep't of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332
A.2d 630 (Md. 1975).
46. See Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1994).
In order to establish an easement by prescription, the claim-
ant must meet the six criteria set out . . .
1. The burden of proving the elements essential to the
acquisition of a prescriptive easement is on the party'claim-
ing the easement.
2. The law presumes that the use of a way over another's
land is permissive or with the owner's consent unless the
contrary appears.
3. The use must be adverse, hostile, or under claim of
right . ...
4. The use must be open and notorious . ...
5. The adverse use must be continuous and uninter-
rupted for a period of twenty years . ...
6. There must be substantial identity of the easement
claimed .. ...
Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n v. Holden
Beach Enter., 404 S.E.2d 677 (N.C. 1991) (emphasis omitted). See also
Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (no prescriptive ease-
ments permitted.); Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. 1986); Akau
v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130 (Haw. 1982); Dep't of Natural Re-
sources v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630 (Md. 1975).
47. See Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1276 (D.C. 1992)
(discussing the various means by which property may be acquired in-
cluding custom); see also Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969);
Piper v. Voorhees, 155 A. 556, 559 (Me. 1931); Graham v. Walker, 61
A.2d 98, 99 (Conn. 1905); Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 179 (no
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press or implied trust.48
Once the type of protected property is identified, either specif-
ically or generically, the question has arisen as to whether a gov-
ernment can dispose of public trust property once acquired. 49
Some courts have concluded that the government cannot dispose
of public trust property and that any attempt to do so is voidable
or void ab initio.5° To these persons the public trust doctrine may
be a simple immutable principle or a means to democratize a
check on a corrupt executive or legislature. 51 Others have con-
cluded that trust property can pass into private hands, while re-
maining quiescently impressed with the trust which can awaken
any time it is in the public interest.52 Still others have held that
government may transfer trust property so long as the grantee
will place it into public service by executing a trust purpose
through private initiative. 53 Finally, some have held that trust
property may, in circumstances not fully delimited, pass unfet-
tered into the private domain.54
custom proved in the case.); David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrec-
tion of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1375
(1996); De Jure Maris Cap. V, supra note 23.
48. See ARCHER, supra note 4, at 30; see also Slade, supra note 4, at
225.
49. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 483
(1988) (stating that the decision is governed by state law).
50. See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 394 (1926). For
a list of state positions see West Indian Co. v. Virgin Islands, 643 F.
Supp. 869, 876 (D. V.I. 1986) (the California Constitution prohibits
alienation).
51. See Sax, supra note 4.
52. See Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874, 877 (R.I. 1991); see also
Lake Michigan Federation v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
742 F. Supp. 441, 445 (N.D. Ill. 1990); CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker,
755 P.2d 1115, 1117-18 (Ala. 1988).
53. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 16; see also West Indian Co. v. Virgin Is-
lands, 844 F.2d 1007, 1018 (3d. Cir. 1988); City of Alameda v. Todd
Shipyards Corp., 632 E Supp. 333, 336 (Cal. 1986); Besig v. Friend, 463
F. Supp. 1053, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
54. See Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (Ill. 1903); see also
Dardar v. LaFourche, 985 F.2d 824, 829 (5th Cir. 1993); City of Berkeley
v. Superior Ct. of Alameda City, 606 P.2d 362, 369 (Cal. 1980); Long
Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 437-38 (Cal. 1970); California Co. v.
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One feature of the public trust doctrine appears clear, at least
in theory. A transfer of property by government must be volun-
tary to be effective. 5 Absent a statute to the contrary, title may
not be obtained from government by operation of law through
adverse possession.5 6 This condition generally prevails notwith-
standing open, notorious, hostile and continuous pro-active pos-
session, under color of title or otherwise.5 7
The actual contemporary definition of the public trust varies
from state to state and the only certain observation that might
be made about the doctrine is that there is no single or uniform,
explanation or application. However, there does seem to be basic
consensus that the public trust does, at least, encompass land
flowed by the tide that might be put to a navigational use. 8 Per-
haps this is the extent of the true scope of the doctrine. Unfor-
tunately, the identification of a physical limitation does not de-
finitively explain its source. The longer the doctrine is exposed
to the light of analysis, the more it becomes clear that the term
is truly political/legal in content, and philosophical/social in
context.
Price, 74 So. 2d 1, 5 (La. 1954).
55. See United States v. 11.037 Acres of Land, 685 F. Supp 214
(N.D. Cal 1988). But see Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423 (Cal;
1970) (reclamation of land does not extinguish the public trust unless
freed by the legislature); United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F.
Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981) (condemnation of land by the U.S. does not
extinguish the public trust).
56. See Latovick, supra note 5 (for a review of authorities).
57. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988);
see also Corvalles Sand Co. v. State Land Bd., 439 P.2d 575, 582 (Or.
1968); People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859 (Cal. 1980); Idaho Forest In-
dus. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement Dist., 733 P.2d 733
(Idaho 1987) (once the water has receded, the exposed land is no
longer subject to the public trust and can be taken by adverse posses-
sion); California v. Superior Ct. of Placer County, 625 P.2d 256 (Cal.
1981) (estoppel will not apply against the government);" Amigos De
Bolsa Chica v. Signal Properties, Inc., 190 Cal. Rptr. 798,(1983) (the
Statute of Limitations will not apply against the government).
58. See ARCHER, supra note 4.
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2. The Historical Jurisprudential Myth
The purported source59 of these features of property is fre-
quently referenced as found in Justinian's Institutes 2.1:
[W] e turn to things. They are either in the category of private
wealth or not. Things can be: everybody's by the law of nature;
the state's; a corporation's; or nobody's. But most things belong
to individuals, who acquire them in a variety of ways . . . . 1.
The things which are naturally everybody's are: air, flowing
water, the sea, and the sea-shore. So nobody can be stopped
from going on to the sea-shore. But he must keep away from
houses, monuments, and buildings. Unlike the sea, rights to
those things are not determined by the law of all people. 2. Riv-
ers and harbours are state property. So everybody shares the
right to fish in them. 3. The sea-shore extends as far as the
highest winter tide. 4. The law of all peoples allows public use
of river banks, as of the rivers themselves: everybody is free to
navigate rivers, and they can moor their boats to the banks, run
ropes from trees growing there, and unload cargo. But owner-
ship of the banks is vested in the adjacent landowners. That
also makes them owners of the trees which grow there. 5. The
law of all peoples gives the public a similar right to use the sea-
shore, and the sea itself. Anyone is free to put up a hut there
to shelter himself. He can dry his nets, or beach his boat. The
right view is that ownership of these shores is vested in no one
at all. Their legal position is the same as that of the sea and
the land or sand under the sea. 6. Corporate, as opposed to in-
dividual, property consists in things in towns . . . in fact in all
things vested in the citizen body .... Things become the prop-
59. Over two-thirds of the Institutes of Justinian are taken virtually
verbatim from the Institutes of Gaius. See OLGA ELVELINE,TELLEGEN-
COUPERUS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW 144 (Routledge 1993); see
also THE INSTITUTES OF GAius (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans.
1988); FRANcIS'DE ZULUETA, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS: PART II COMMEN-
TARY (1953, 1967). It is also important to note that notwithstanding
claimed historical origin and the propensity of advocates to compare,
by analogy, the public trust doctrine to the general Anglo-American
subject area of trusts and uses, trusts were essentially unknown to Ro-
man law. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUST-
EES, § 9 (Rev. 2d ed. 1984) ("Although trusts were not known in Ro-
man or civil law, and at present are not recognized in the codes of
most civil law countries, there have been some recent developments
which may lead to greater recognition of trusts created in common law
countries by courts in civil law jurisdictions.").
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erty of individuals in many ways, some by the law of nature,
which, as we have said, can be described as the law of all peo-
ples, and others by our state law .... Obviously natural law is
the earlier. It is the product of the natural order, as old as man
himself. Systems of state law did not start to develop until cities
were founded, magistracies were established, and law began to
be written.6"
Proponents of pressing land into public service have seized
upon these words as reporting nothing less than a universal
truth. However, they may have, in their advocacy, elevated a
mere legal philosophical preference to the level of undeserved
authority.61
The foundation of the principle is, unfortunately, an arguably
deficient exercise in historical jurisprudential analysis.6 First, the
Institutes may be of no greater than tertiary value as an authorita-
tive resource. They have, in fact, been likened to a hornbook for
the law students of the day, or at times, a normative statement of
what the emperor might have wished the law to be. The Institutes
60. JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 55 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans.,
Cornell Univ. Press 1987).
61. The perceived needs of navigation and commerce stimulated
the Roman law of the sea and shore. Piscary was also a secondary con-
cern. "But there was also a sentiment, primarily Stoic and philosophi-
cal, that unless and until a private person or the state required exclusive
control of the resource, the sea and shore should be open for the use
of all." Deveney, supra note 23, at 21.
A Stoic philosophy became the principal influence on the
Roman educated class, and on the Roman lawyers . .. .[I] ts
central message was that everything in nature is to be ex-
plained by reason; and every act must be justified by rea-
son . . . . [A]lthough the decline of Greece went chrono-
logically with the rise of Rome, the Stoic philosophy found a
most congenial soil in the Roman temperament too; the
streak of austerity, of simplicity, of indifference to good or ill
fortune, which the Romans liked to admire in themselves or
in their ancestors, represented a rather similar disciplining of
self . . . . At any rate, the Stoic view of the world virtually
conquered the mind of the late Roman republic and of the
early empire; almost all the Roman jurists . . . followed Stoic
teaching ....
J. M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Thought- 48 (1992).
62. See Deveney, supra note 23; Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal
Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Doctrine, 79 YALE LJ. 762 (1970).
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were originally intended to serve only as a short introduction to
the Corpus Juris Civile. They were a simple beginner's book, a
map designed to order the larger law library contained in the ac-
companying digest and codex.63 There is also considerable specu-
lation that they contain innumerable reforms that Justinian
brought into the text.64
Second, the dependent internal reference to the law of na-
ture65 as the source of the doctrine infuses the principle with an
elusive origin and further obfuscates its political and organic rel-
evance. 66 In this regard, if the Institutes are to be of genuine
63. "Translated rather than anglicized, the name of the Institutes
would be 'Introduction' or 'Basic Principles'. The Latin 'Institutiones'
comes from the verb 'instituere'. One of whose meanings is 'to teach'.
Justinian also gave the book an alternate name, 'Elementa'. This means
much the same, though there is a hint of nourishment, the basic prin-
ciples on which to grow. An equivalent modern title would be 'AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO LAW OR FIRST PRINCIPLES OF LAW'. It is a book for begin-
ners, only one twentieth the size of the Digest. It cannot quite be
called the first year course-book, because Justinian's revised system of
legal education required first year students to do more. Deveney, supra
note 23, at 12. See also THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN (Theodor Mommsen,
Paul Krueger and Alan Watson ed. and trans.1985) (noting that the In-
stitutes were a basic and beginners book); A. ARTHUR SCHILLER, ROMAN
LAw MECHANISMS OF DEVELOPMENT 31 (1978) ("The first part of the
Corpus luris was compiled for Justinian as an introductory course of
law study for first-year law-students. It was based on earlier books of In-
stitutes, particularly on that of Gaius, a renowned law teacher and
scholar who lived in the second century of our era, some three and a
half centuries before the reign of Justinian.").
64. "The pages of the Institutes look different from those of the Di-
gest. They do not look like a patchwork of extracts. Each title appears
to be a single continuous essay. But in fact, though the Digest's careful
attributions' have been dispensed with, the method of composition is
the same, subject to two differences. First, the decision to create the
impression of a continuous text must have involved rather more man-
agement of the extracts. Secondly, many Justinianic reforms are
brought into the text." Birks & McLeod, supra note 60, at 12. There is
also indication that Justinian was influenced by the Stoic perspective.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
66. One author writes:
[T] he Roman philosophers . ..used the concept of nature
in a way very different from what the Roman jurist meant by
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it; and the jurists' usage, in its turn, was not uniform. All
these different employments of 'nature' represented at the
same time so many expressions of legal theory ... . It is in
Cicero, who was writing in high-minded academic detach-
ment, that we encounter a conception of natural law which
not only strongly resembles the Christian teaching but, very
likely, has actually contributed something to the formation of
that teaching. In his treatise De legibus ('On the Laws'), cer-
tainly influenced both by Aristotelian and by Stoic doctrine,
he presents nature as the source of precepts to the human
individual, a source accessible to every such individual
through his or her reason; and this provision for human
conduct has its origin in God.
Kelly, supra note 61, at 57-58 (1992).
If we move now to the Roman jurists we see that, although
they very frequently speak of natural law and natural reason
(ius naturale, naturalis ratio) as well as using the word 'natu-
ral', in certain cases, to qualify concepts like possession and
obligation, they mean by this usage, in almost every case,
something quite different from Cicero's concept of a primor-
dial higher law. When they speak of natural law or natural
reason underlying some rule or institution they are talking
not of the law or reason of God, but of the nature of things
on the ground, things as they are, things for which common
sense, the facts of life, the essence of business relations, and
so on, 'naturally' suggest the appropriate legal treatment.
"For 'natural' was to them", wrote Ernst Levy, "not only what
followed from physical qualities of men or things, but also
what, within the framework of that system, seemed to square
with the normal and reasonable order of human interests
and, for this reason, not in need of any further evidence."
Id. at 61 (citing ERNST LEW, Natural Law in Roman Thought, in Studia et
Documenta Historiae et Iuris, 7, 15 (1949)). See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, 206-10 (1980).
But there is a very much more serious problem, deriving
from the simple fact that the whole of Justinian's 'Corpus of
Civil Law', including the Digest, was given the force of law; it
was to be living law, not history, and it alone was to govern
the lives of the people and the practice of the courts. Now
since the writings of the eminent jurists of the distant 'classi-
cal' past, though in general too valuable to lose, contained
much that was by Justinian's time obsolete and had to be
abolished, it was necessary to alter or 'interpolate' their ex-
cerpts in the Digest, to bring them to date, expunge refer-
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precedental value, there must be due sensitivity to the delicate
balance of the social/political context from which they were
drawn. There must also be sensitivity to the jurisprudential per-
spective that the Institutes reflect.67 For example, to Justinian, the
law of all peoples and the law of the state are distinguished as
follows:
All peoples with laws and customs apply law which is partly
theirs alone and partly shared by all mankind. The law which
each people makes for itself is special to its own state. It is
called 'state law', the law peculiar to the state. But the law
which natural reason makes for all mankind is applied every-
where. It is called 'the law of all peoples' because it is common
to every nation . . . . Law comes into being without writing
when a rule is approved by use. Long-standing custom founded
on the consent of those who follow it is just like legisla-
tion . . . . The law of nature, which is observed uniformly by
all peoples, is sanctioned by divine providence and lasts forever,
strong and unchangeable. 6
ences . . . . Only, therefore, if we can distinguish the origi-
nal from the interpolated in these fragments can we say what
the law was in the opinion of Ulpian and the rest; and in
many cases we cannot do this with conviction. If all the
places in the Digest that have been incriminated for interpo-
lation in the last hundred years were laid end to end and ex-
punged there would be little left ....
JA. CROoK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 14-15 (H.H. Sculland ed., 1967).
67. The influence of Roman law in the formation of English law is
not without controversy. See JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES, supra note 60, at 8
("In England and America it is more a question of keeping alert to
borrowings and avoiding explanations which are blind to the Roman
teaching which is always in the background."); WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE
PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAw AND THEIR RELATION TO MODERN LAw 56-57
(1938) ("Blackstone . . . emphasizes the greater importance of the
Common Law of England, and attributes the continued teaching, in his
day, of the Civil Law in the English universities to the influence of the
"Poppish clergy." . . . . Blackstone's views were influenced, doubtless,
by his political and ecclesiastical environment."). See also New Perspec-
tives in the Roman Law of Property: Essays For Barry Nicholas (Peter
Birks ed., 1989); W. W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. McNAIR, ROMAN LAw &
COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE (1936); SCHILLER, supra note
63, at 10.
68. JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES, supra note 60, at 37.
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Is it not possible, if not probable, that people of diverse cul-
tures, varying social histories, and different temporal experiences
would view state law and natural law in different ways?69 Un-
doubtably, it has been suggested that Roman jurists and Roman
philosophers had divergent views of the essential significance of
natural law.70 In addition, similar terms often possess different
significance to different peoples at different times. One writer,
commenting on the work of the 1 3 ,h century theorist, Bracton,
noted that "first of all , . . in England less attention is given to
the natural law than in any other region of the world because
the King of England is called the Lord of the Seas on account of
the power he has over the waters."'" Such qualifying views raise
doubt about the utility and perhaps integrity of either resting
contemporary legal principle upon such an historically intuitive
device or to impress a notion of public trust as authority upon
people who do not fully comprehend its antecedents, context or
consequences. 72 The insight of the Institutes may severely limit,
69. The concept of rights in the common law is quite different
from that found in Roman law. Some have suggested that there were
no true rights of citizens as we have come to know them in Roman law.
Consequently, care should be taken to avoid transporting such princi-
ples into contemporary legal thought. See also Finnis, supra note 66.
70. See supra note 66.
71. Deveney, supra note 23 (citing Henry de Bracton & Portius
Azo, Selected Passages From The Works of Bracton and Azo 125 (F. W.
MAITLAND ed. 1895)).
72. Prior to 1256, Bracton wrote a book entitled DE LEGIBUS ET
CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLLIAE that addressed the interests in the foreshore
and was claimed to have been based upon Roman law.
It will be noted that sec. 5 of the Institutes, which states that
there can be no property in the shores, is wholly omitted by
Bracton, and upon this Hall (p. 105) argues that Bracton did
not mean to deny that the ownership (such as it was) rested
with the King, asserting only that the use was common to all,
as that of the sea was, and (says Hall) so far he will be found
essentially right; but it is submitted that this reasoning is un-
sound, for Bracton must have been well aware that through-
out the kingdom, the foreshore in the point of property was
in very numerous places vested in the lords of manors, al-
though subject to the jus publicum. It has, however, been
clearly decided that many of the passages which Bracton
took from the Civil Law are inconsistent with, and form no
part of, the English Common Law.
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rather than liberate, the public trust doctrine. Therefore, it is
somewhat disruptive that many courts and commentators have
embraced the Institutes as the germinal voice of public reason,
particularly when the apposite traditions are those of another civ-
ilization under the influence of variant social mores, and perhaps
poorly understood by those who put them to use. 73
Third, from a very practical sense, many of the actual primary
sources from which the Institutes were derived have either been
altered, destroyed or remain undiscovered. Additionally, the sec-
ondary and tertiary commentaries are generally inaccessible to
anyone not fluent in Greek, Latin or German. Furthermore,
even if interested parties possess the necessary ability and curios-
ity, the documents are not widely available. Finally, there is legiti-
mate speculation as to whether the sources report actual contro-
versies and resolutions or whether they are, in fact, hypotheticals
or moot exercises employed by scholars of the day as parables. 74
MOORE, supra note 23, at 33 (1888).
73. The Roman view adapted along with their culture:
At the moment when the Roman law first yields historically
reliable data, i.e., the era of the Twelve Tablets or a little ear-
lier, say the late sixth century BC, the institution of private
property is already clearly established . . . . It is, however,
agreed that at an earlier stage some form of tribal or collec-
tive ownership of land existed . . . . Only very sparse traces
of anything like a theory of private property, whether of its
origin or of its justification, appear in Roman literature. The
picture drawn by Lucretius ... suggests a primeval condition
in which all wants could be satisfied from the bounty of the
earth, a condition then disrupted by the effects of greed ...
the order subsequently imposed by men on themselves to
avert chaos implies the protection of the individual in the
enjoyment of what is 'his'. Similarly, Cicero, in the only ex-
plicit ideology of property that the Roman literature seems
to contain, compares the world's goods to the seating in a
public theatre: 'just as, though the theatre is something pub-
licly owned, yet one can properly say that the seat each per-
son has taken is his, so in the state or in the world, though
these too are common property, still no argument of right
can be opposed to the idea that each man's goods should be
his own'.
KELLY, supra note 61, at 76-77 (footnote omitted).
74. CROOK, supra note 66, at 15. [W]e know something of the im-
aginary cases that were argued in the rhetorical schools . . . and the
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As a result, it is unlikely that policy or decision makers will ever
be able to formulate a personal, genuine, and informed opinion
of the traditions upon which they purport to rely in the course
of reallocating contemporary interests in property using the pub-
lic trust doctrine. Most unfortunate, however, may be that due to
the common law tradition and shortsighted use of the usual
technique of legal synthesis, few will even try. In a veritable rush
to constitute the policies of public interest in natural resources,
some may instead choose to rest their decisions upon the equivo-
cal or inaccurate judgments of prior authorities. While this con-
dition is not alien to our American judicial history, and other in-
fluential decisions have been founded upon a misreading of
precedent,75 or the presumed existence of a law that, unknown
to the court, did not exist,7 6 it may not be a characteristic that
cases in the Digest have a quite different ring of practicality - even if
imaginary they are in terms of law and society .... The Digest often
gives its litigants stock names (Seius, Titius and so on), and cases
where these names appear may well be invented for discussion .... Id.
See also Anthony Maurice Honore, Justinian's Digest Work in Progress
(Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1983) (Oxford 1971); IV Digest of Justinian,
supra note 63.
75. Justice William Douglas wrote an opinion in Bowles v. Willing-
ham, 321 U.S. 503, 520 (1994), concluding that simple judicial review of
an administrative decision would satisfy the rigors of prcicedural due
process. In so doing he cited the case of Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589 (1931) as support for the proposition. Douglas, paraphrasing
Justice Brandeis in Phillips, stated: "Where only property rights are in-
volved, mere postponement of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of
due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determi-
nation of the liability is adequate." Id. at 596-97. While the Phillips case
does indicate that the timing of due process protection may be ad-
justed so as to provide a hearing after property rights have been af-
fected, it emphasized that the hearing that was to be provided in the
case was "a complete hearing de novo ..... Id. at 598. Such was not
the conclusion in Bowles. Commentators have suggested that Justice
Douglas set a new and diminished jurisprudential standard of due pro-
cess review while misreading or not fully appreciating the limitations in
the material he cited as his influence.
76. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), Chief Jus-
tice Hughes wrote for the Court. The case arose when certain individu-
als were criminally charged with violating Petroleum Code, Article III,
Section 4, a portion of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The Petro-
leum Code, however had been modified by an executive order of Presi-
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ought to be revered and consciously inculcated for the sole pur-
pose of achieving a preferred social goal.
Finally, there is ample commentary that reflects or admits of
the discontinuity in the historical development and interpreta-
tion and the rather serious disagreement over the legal basis,
definition, applicability and vitality of the public trust theory.
77
dent Roosevelt in which Section 4 had been eliminated for a period
apposite to the charges against the defendants. Noting the oversight,
the Court stated:
The controversy with respect to the provision of . . . the Pe-
troleum Code was initiated and proceeded in the courts be-
low upon a false assumption. That assumption was that this
section still contained the paragraph (eliminated by the Ex-
ecutive Order of September 13, 1933) by which the produc-
tion in excess of assigned quotas was made an unfair practice
and a violation of the code. Whatever the cause of the fail-
ure to give appropriate public notice of the change in the
section, with the result that the persons affected, the prose-
cuting authorities, and the courts, were alike ignorant of the
alteration, the fact is that the attack in this respect was upon
a provision which did not exist. . . . When this suit was
brought, and when it was heard, there was no cause of ac-
tion for the injunction sought.
Id. at 412-13.
This case was the stimulus for creating the Federal Register.
77. See MOoRE, supra note 23. In speaking of the influence of the
Magna Carta as a source of public interest one author notes:
" [L] imitations, found in Chapters 16 and 23, are in themselves of little
practical significance and are, in their origins, historically unrelated to
what they became through the process of creative judicial misunder-
standing in favor of the public's rights." Patrick Deveney, Jus Publicum
and the Public Trust: A Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L. J. 13, 39 (1976).
In the context of analyzing the New Jersey case of Arnold v. Mundy, 6
N.J.L. 1 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1821), the same author observed: "As a policy
decision to reclaim for the people of the coastal area of the state which
would have otherwise been entirely in private hands, Arnold v. Mundy is
an impressive display of judicial dexterity; as history it is nonsense."
Deveney, at 56. In another article commenting upon the public trust
doctrine and its development, Deveney writes: "The current situation is
unsatisfactory. The protection afforded the public interest in tidal areas
lags behind an exploding demand/supply ratio .... In part because of
this lag, and in part because of its history, tidal doctrine is over-
complex, if not confused." 79 YALE LJ., supra note 62, at 773. Commen-
tators are not, however, alone in the equivocation; judges could be in-
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This commentary actually includes a number of the seminal
and most influential judicial opinions, which have expanded the
public trust doctrine. The obfuscation of principle in these
sources is, however, most disturbing. To highlight an elemental
example, the Magna Carta has often been referenced as signifi-
cant in the chain of English authorities verifying the public inter-
est in the seashore. The relevant section of that venerable docu-
ment, chapter 33, states that "(a)ll kydells (weirs) for the future
shall be removed altogether from Thames and Medway, and
throughout all England . ". .."' Unacknowledged in many refer-
ences, however, is the immediately adjacent and qualifying lan-
guage in the document that continues, "except upon the sea-
shore." 9 The longevity of this unfortunate tendency to distort
the public trust doctrine could be exemplified by another refer-
ence to the thirteenth century work of Bracton purporting to re-
flect the state of English law at the time. Claiming to rely upon
Roman Law, Bracton concluded that the sea and seashore are
common to all.80 However, in so doing he altered the Roman
texts and omitted the significant qualification found therein that
cluded within their ranks. For example, Chief Justice Taney, writing in
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842), noted: "We do not propose
to meddle with the point which was very much discussed at the bar, as
to the power of the king, since the Magna Carta, to grant to a subject a
portion of the soil covered by the navigable waters of the kingdom, so
as to give him an immediate and exclusive right of fishery, either for
shell-fish or floating fish, within the limits of his grant. The question is
not free from doubt, and the authorities referred to in the English
books cannot, perhaps, be altogether reconciled.
78. WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA A COMMENTARY ON
THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 403 (1905). "It has been gratuitously
assumed that the motive for prohibiting these 'kydells' must have been
• . .to prevent any monopoly in rights of fishing. Law courts and writ-
ers on jurisprudence for many centuries endorsed this mistaken view,
and treated the Magna Carta as an absolute prohibition of the creation
of 'several' (or exclusive) fisheries in tidal waters. Although this legal
doctrine has been frequently and authoritatively enunciated, it rests on
a historical misconception. The Great Charter sought to protect free-
dom of navigation, not freedom of fishing; and this is obvious from the
last words of the chapter . . . 'except upon the sea coast.' " Id. at 403.
79. Id. See also 79 YALE LJ., supra note 62, at 766; Deveney, 1 SEA
GRANT LJ., supra note 23, at 39; see generally Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S.
367 (1842).
80. See MOORE, supra note 23, at 33-34.
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the property of the shore was in no one. He also ignored Azo,
his authoritative source, who explained that such common things
could be appropriated to private hands by occupation.8 Com-
mentators have well noted this preference adjustment to princi-
ple. "It will therefore be seen that Bracton must have been well
aware that the property in the foreshore was, at any rate in some
cases, vested in the subject, and for that reason he omitted the
passages in the Institutes which avers that the property in it can-
not be owned by anyone."8 Other writers have labeled such
events as creative judicial misunderstandings. 83 Scholars, too,
seem at times to conveniently overlook that certain authors did
not intend to be mere reporters but, rather, were position
advocates8 4
81. See id.
82. See id. Also of interest is Blundell v. Catterall, 106 ENGL. REP.
1190, 1198 (K.B. 1821), an important germinal English case in which
Justice Holroyd reviews and discounts claims made upon the authority
of Justinian and Bracton, rejecting them as inconsistent with estab-
lished principles of English law. See also Deveney, 1 SEA GRANT LJ., at
40. In discussing the Magna Carta Chief Justice Hale notes: "The ex-
ception of weares upon the sea-coasts, and likewise frequent examples,
some whereof are before mentioned, make it appear that there might
be such private interests not only in point of liberty, but in point of
propriety, on the sea-coast and below the low-water mark; for such
were regularly all weares." De Jure Maris supra note 23 at 389.
83. Deveney, 1 SEA GRANT LJ., supra note 23, at 39.
84. Thomas Digges wrote a treatise in 1568-69 entitled PROOFS OF
THE QUEEN'S INTEREST IN LANDS LEFT BY THE SEA AND THE SALT SHORES
THEREOF. This tract is frequently noted as the source of the prima-facie
theory of the public trust.
By this treatise was first invented and set up the claim of the
Crown to the foreshore, reclaimed land, salt marsh, and der-
elict land in right of prerogative. Mr. Digges boldly affirms
that no one can make title to the foreshore or land over-
flowed by the sea, and says it is a sure maxim in the com-
mon law that "whatsoever land there is within the King's do-
minion whereunto no man can justly make property, it is the
King's by prerogative ... .
But is has been decided that Mr. Digges' argument is un-
sound in the law. It is now settled that the foreshore may be
shewn to be parcel of the manor . . . yet we find the of-
ficers of the Crown still at this day persistently asserting Mr.
Digges' contention . . . .Upon Mr. Digges' theory they pro-
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Therefore, if we are swayed by the emotional appeal of an ar-
gument, accept its purported weight, and fail to critically analyze
its synthesis with other seminal principles of our democratic re-
public, we likely invite the doctrinal indeterminacy and disinte-
gration of principle observed in some of the recent public trust
cases, and some would claim, certain of the recent Supreme
Court takings decisions. Perhaps we ought to take heed of the
observations of Birks & McLeod in their translation of The Insti-
ceed from day to day, and have done so persistently since
1830, as if the theory were true in fact. When a question
arises as to the true ownership of a piece of foreshore, they
institute no inquiry to see whether it has been granted out;
they make no investigation as to whether the true owner can
shew a sufficient enjoyment for the requisite statutory pe-
riod; but they sell or lease it behind his back, without giving
him notice or opportunity to make good his claim; and if he
asserts it by taking steps against some trespasser, or by doing
any substantial act himself, they call upon him to shew his
grant and his evidence; if he produces his grant (supposing
him to have one in existence), they question its validity; if he
produces his evidence of user, they treat it as usurpation, or
endeavor to explain away the affect of it by alleging that his
acts and those of his predecessors have been done in the ex-
ercise of his and their rights of water frontage. They proceed
against him by the arbitrary and unconstitutional process of
information (without any previous inquisition to charge the
land to the Crown), and they make him set out his title and
discover his documents, and answer interrogatories of the
most searching kind; they refuse any discovery of their own
documents, and when he has done his utmost to set forth
every scrap of information in his power, they arbitrarily
amend the information without leave of the Court, and put
him again through the same process, and further re-amend,
and further re-amend the information ad infinitum arbitrarily
at their own option and without control of the Court. That
kept the suit hanging over his head for years until all his wit-
nesses are dead, for they cannot be ruled on as an ordinary
litigant can; and they have it in their power to crush him
with costs which he is helpless to avoid, and this wholly and
solely upon an allegation of a theory, a theory of fact which
is untrue, and which was invented by the ingenuity of Mr.
Thomas Digges in the treatise set out below.
MooRE, supra note 23, at 182-84 (referring to Digges' original treatise).
Cf John Selden, Of The Dominion or Ownership of the Sea (1972).
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tutes: "In England and America it is more a question of keeping
alert to borrowings and avoiding explanations which are blind to
the Roman learning which is always in the background."85
The real question may be whether the ethics of the legal sys-
tem can tolerate the intensified use of such an amorphous fic-
tion considering the structural violence that it does to other sem-
inal principles of legal process. The use of the public trust
doctrine as used in the service of immediate social reorganiza-
tion may expose the operative attributes of the traditional com-
mon law to ridicule as a mere contrivance. As a byproduct it may
also bring the organizing themes of precedent and stare decisis
into disrespect. Like individual thoughts of human mortality, the
broader jurisprudential content of these themes may be found to
have been conveniently thrust into the legal subconscious to per-
mit one to meet the daily challenges of the living law. However,
at the least, an honest and analytical examination of the princi-
ple may demonstrate that no matter how crisply and cleanly we
would like to pretend that the drape of justice is cut, the edges
are, in fact, unfinished. If lawyers were to assume that posture,
they might be better equipped to meet the challenges of
tomorrow.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST IN DELAWARE AND NEW JERSEY
After presenting the broad policy observations, it is now in-
structive to briefly compare and contrast the development of the
public trust doctrine in two adjacent jurisdictions that share a
body of water affected by the tide, namely Delaware and New
Jersey. Through this comparison the similarities, and more im-
portantly the differences, within what has been presented by ad-
vocates as a uniform principle become distinguishable.
In the early case, New Jersey v. Delaware,86 the border between
the two states upon the Delaware River and Bay was at issue. The
title in controversy upon which Delaware relied in part, until the
War of Independence with England, was that transmitted to Wil-
liam Penn and his successors by estoppel from the Duke of York
in 1682.87 The claim thereafter was founded upon a transfer in
85. JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES, supra note 60, at 9.
86. 291 U.S. 361 (1934).
87. Cf Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
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law on July 4, 1776 and a confirmation of the transfer by the
Treaty of Paris in 1783. In deciding the dispute, the Court ad-
dressed certain common law principles that had an early influ-
ence upon defining the principles of the public trust.
In response to a claim by New Jersey that the Crown was with-
out power to grant away soil beneath navigable waters, the Court
noted "[t]here is high authority for the view that power was in
the Crown by virtue of the jus privatum to convey the soil be-
neath the waters for uses merely private, but subject always to the
jus publicum, the right to navigate and fish."88 While the grant at
issue was an instrument of government, the Court did note, in
addressing whether that title was impaired by the wharfing out
into the river by the State of New Jersey, that in Delaware, unlike
New Jersey, title to the foreshore is in the riparian proprietor. In
New Jersey the common law rule that the state owns the fore-
shore has always been followed, i.e., the riparian owner owns
only to the high water mark. In Delaware, however, the riparian
owner holds to the low water mark.89 In settling the dispute over
ownership of the submerged and tidal lands, the Court con-
cluded that within the twelve mile circle of the specific grant,
near New Castle, the river and the subaquaeous soil up to the
low water mark on the New Jersey side belonged to Delaware
and below the twelve mile circle and without the grant the
boundary was the middle of the ship channel in the Delaware
River and Bay. The Court also acknowledged the diversity in de-
fining coastal boundaries.
Having noted the generic issues that implicate the character of
governmentally owned property at the periphery of fast land, the
identified but limited purposes that define the character from
the viewpoint of the Supreme Court, and the diverse application
to geographic boundaries within the subject states, it would now
be propitious to turn to a concise survey of the respective inter-
pretatio.ns of the public trust as found in New Jersey and
Delaware.
88. 291 U.S. 361, 373.
89. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 375 (1934).
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A. The New Jersey View
New Jersey has employed quite an expansive interpretation of
the Public Trust Doctrine in its contemporary decisions.90 The
current tone was begun in the case of Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea. 9' The question before the court was
whether an oceanfront municipality could charge residents dif-
ferent rates than non-residents for use of a municipally owned
beach area.92 In the course of its decision the court observed
that " [y] ears ago Avon's beach, like the rest of New Jersey, was
90. The State of New Jersey has instituted a program whereby it
has identified certain lands previously flowed by the tides and that were
purported to have been filled and sold to private persons. The State
has proceeded to offer to quiet title to said lands and transfer title to
the holders upon payment of a fee. See Marc Duvoisin, On Tidal Lands,
Homeowners' Nightmares Come True, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (October 5,
1986); see also Marc Duvoisin, Its Tidal-land Origin Haunts Exclusive Ava-
lon Neighborhood, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (October 6, 1986); Dan Weiss-
man, Riparian Rights Buy-Back Clouds Title and Angers Homeowners at
Shore, THE SUNDAY STAR-LEDGER (October 2, 1988). See also John P. El-
lington et al., Comment, State Riparian Claims: A New Direction in Reve-
nue Raising, 2 DicK J. ENV[L. L. & PoLIcY 35 (1992); William E. Ander-
son, Esq., Deputy Attorney General and Special Counsel to the
Tidelands Resource Council of New Jersey, State Tidelands in New
Jersey and the Public Trust Doctrine, Lecture at The Dickinson School
of Law (Nov. 24, 1992). This is not unlike early activities of the Crown
in England to support its continued needs:
On the accession of James I (knowing, as we do, the exalted
notion that King had of the rights of the prerogative) one is
not surprised to find that the efforts of his officials were re-
doubled. This searching and careful inquiry usurpations, or
supposed usurpations, of the rights of the Crown not un-
naturally brought into existence a class of persons known as
"title-hunters,"who made a regular profession of gathering
information respecting titles in order to discover some flaw
in them by which lands might be brought into the net of the
Exchequer commissioners with a view to the impeachment of
the title on behalf of the crown, or the extortion of black-
mail for a new grant to cure the supposed defect in the title.
MooRE, supra note 23, at 16, 170-71. The lands would then be resold ei-
ther to the original transferee or to another member of the public.
91. 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
92. See id. at 48.
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free to all comers." 93 Early statutes had granted to municipalities
the power to institute charges for beach use. These were judi-
cially characterized as a mere delegation of state police power,
and extended to "any municipality bordering on the Atlantic
Ocean . . . which owns or shall acquire, by any deed of dedica-
tion or otherwise, lands bordering on the ocean ... or easement
rights therein . . . . 9 In concluding that the borough may not
discriminate against non-residents by charging the different fees,
the court rested its decision on what it perceived as a modern
meaning of the public trust doctrine.95
There are several important questions that might be asked.
First, did the dry sand area under consideration possess the geo-
morphological characteristics that, in the language of cited pre-
cedent, justified special treatment? Second, was it necessary or
proper for the court to rely upon an amplified doctrine of pub-
lic trust for the purpose of deciding the case when there were
more accepted and traditional doctrines within municipal law
that could have been employed? Third, was the creeping expan-
sion of the doctrine consistent with a genuine respect for such
tenets of legal decision making as precedent and stare decisis?
Fourth, did the decision demonstrate due cognizance of the
broader and traditional policies of property law including the fa-
vored stability of titles and the demands postulated by the tak-
ings concerns as found in the U.S. Constitution?
In this regard, there are several important observations that
can be made about the opinion. First, the court referenced the
early case of Arnold v. Mundyf6 in support of its application of the
public trust doctrine. That case indicated: "[T]he things which
constitute this common property are things in which a sort of tran-
sient usufructuary possession, only, can be had . . ."9 The Avon
court never explained, however, why the physical character of
the fast lands of the dry sand area were so ill-defined or so dif-
ferent from other inland properties as to justify it falling within
the select class of public trust property and therefore, require
93. Id. at 49.
94. Id. at 49-50.
95. See id. at 54.
96. 6 NJ.L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1821).
97. Id. at 71.
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differential treatment. 98 Second, the Avon court observed that
where the upland sand is owned by a municipality, a political
subdivision of the state, and when the area is dedicated to public
beach purposes, it must be open to all on equal terms.99 Would
this not have been an adequate, simple and direct (and, perhaps,
the only) foundation upon which to place the legal conclusion?
Third, the Avon court stated that the scope and limitations of the
doctrine had never been defined with any precision in New
Jersey. 00 The court never explained, however, why it was proper
to depart from traditional notions of stare decisis and available
precedent and conclude that the application of the doctrine in
this instance was natural, predictable and consistent with sound
legal decision-making. Fourth, and important to comprehending
the scope of the court's actioh, it extended the public rights in
tidal lands beyond the prerogatives of fishing and navigation to
include recreational uses.' 0' It stated: "The public trust doctrine,
like all common law principles, should not be considered fixed
or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing
conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.' ' 0 2
Should not such a change have reflected due considerations of
the principles of eminent domain and the advised conditions
under which retrospective alteration of land titles should be
made?
Divested of the perspective of social manipulation of land
management, the Avon decision should be read as simply stating
two principles. First, the geomorphological characteristics of
some areas may make it difficult to adequately identify the fea-
tures necessary for complete transfer into private ownership.
These areas may, therefore, be included within an expanded gov-
ernment interest and the public trust. Second, a cognizable prin-
ciple of state and local government law suggests that when a mu-
nicipality is sub-delegated the authority of police power over
state owned or interested property (the intertidal zone and other
public property held in a municipal capacity), it must honor the
98. See 294 A.2d at 54.
99. See id..
100. See id. at 53.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 54.
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terms of any public dedication or transfer into an explicit public
trust, and govern these areas in a responsive and even-handed
manner for the sovereign of the state. Unfortunately, the court
chose to reject this elemental path. 03 Instead, the decision has
been interpreted as implying that even land possessing the usual
characteristics that make it capable of private ownership, e.g., the
dry sand area, may be impressed with the burden of an inchoate,
expanded and positive right to public access through the public
trust doctrine, and in the judgment of a court an execution of
this interest is proper whenever the public develops and ex-
presses a desire to use it.
Van Ness v. Borough of DeaP°4 continued the trend of judicial ac-
tivism. In that case the public advocate of New Jersey brought
suit against a municipality, charging that it had engaged in dis-
criminatory practices in the maintenance and operation of pub-
licly owned beach and related facilities. 105 A municipally owned
casino was located on the South Beach and was operated on a
restricted basis. 0 6 The public possessed an unrestricted right to
bathe and- swim in the ocean in front of the casino, and it was
also allowed use of a fifty-foot wide strip of dry sand area adja-
cent to the foreshore at the site. 07 The dry sand immediately in
front of the casino was reserved, however, for casino members
and guests. 08 The original suit sought to open the casino facili-
ties, and its adjacent dry sand beach to the public. 09 The trial
court sustained the proposition that the facilities and beach
should be open to the public, and based the decision on the
concept of municipal power and equal protection."l 0 On appeal
to the Appellate Division, the Superior Court concluded first,
that there was no denial of equal protection since the classifica-
tions of membership were reasonable, and second, that the ca-
103. See id. at 51.
104. 393 A.2d 571 (NJ. 1978).
105. See id. at 571.
106. See id. at 572.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See 393 A.2d 571, 572 (N.J. 1978).
110. See id.
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sino beach had not been dedicated to the general public."' As a
consequence, it held that the municipality could restrict use of
the area.112 The public advocate appealed the decision to the
New Jersey Supreme Court." 3
Before the Supreme Court, the public advocate abandoned the
claim that the casino facilities were subject to the public trust
and must, therefore, be opened to the public." 4 The sole con-
tention was that the dry sand beach, seaward of the casino,
should be subject to the doctrine and open to the public."15 The
court held that the municipally owned upland sand area that was
adjacent to tidal waters had to be open to the public under the
public trust doctrine. 16 In so doing it abandoned the limitation
found in Avon that the upland must be dedicated to public
beach purposes in order for the doctrine to apply." 7 The Van
Ness Court determined that notwithstanding that Deal had never
dedicated the area to the public, the beach was dedicated to rec-
reational purposes, and this was sufficient to require that it be
open to the public."8
In the course of its decision, the court opined: "If the area,
which is under municipal ownership and dedication, is subject to
the Public Trust Doctrine, and we hold that it is, all have the
right to use and enjoy it. Deal cannot frustrate the public right
by limiting its dedication of use to residents of Deal." 19 It is this
sentence, rather elusive in its structure, that liberates the oppor-
tunity for infusion of social policy and may, in fact, more prop-
erly reflect a policy predisposition than a strict legal analysis.
Thus, were it to have been interpreted to mean that any dry
sand area that is owned by a municipality becomes impressed
with the terms of the public trust, then it is through a principle
of basic municipal law and a delineation of the field between
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 572-73.
114. See id. at 573.
115. See 393 A.2d 571, 573 (N.J. 1978).
116. See id. at 574.
117. See id. at 573.
118. See id. at 573-74.
119. Id. at 574.
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public and proprietary governmental ownership that the public
gains the right of access. If the sentence is read, however, as im-
plying that all recreational areas adjacent to the intertidal zone
must be open to the public, as some public advocates have sug-
gested, it might be an ambitious, and perhaps improper, judicial
abrogation of private property interests. The Deal court, in fact,
failed to base its decision upon allocated municipal responsibil-
ity. Although it did try to take care to point out that it did not
intend to create a public interest where none existed but was
merely recognizing the preexistence of the right, 20 there was no
indication that any attempt was made to elicit evidence of such a
proprietary condition. 12' To the contrary, reliance was placed
upon a theory of trust "molded and extended to meet changing
conditions and the needs of the public....
In that regard, certain questions might be posed. If effect is
given the latter interpretation, is there any significance to munic-
ipal ownership? Is it only land when governmentally owned that
can be subject to the doctrine? Can land be freed of the trust if
transferred out of public ownership? These are questions that
the later courts would address. At what point is it, however, that
old standards are so adaptable that they lose their past character
and create totally new expectations? 123
The decision in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association1
2 4
suggested answers that appeared to favor public rights. In Mat-
,thews, the court addressed the issue of whether the public had a
right to use dry sand areas, not owned by a municipality but by a
quasi-public body, as ancillary to an enjoyment of tidal lands. In
that decision, the court explicitly acknowledged that the public
trust doctrine had expanded to include municipally owned dry
sand areas. Following an extensive review of the mounting de-
mands for recreational facilities by the public and the various
policies that have responded to the claims, the court concluded:
120. See 393 A.2d 574 (N.J. 1978).
121. Cf Seaway Co. v. Att'y General of Texas, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.
1964).
122. 393 A.2d at 573.
123. See generally, Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 372 A.2d 1133
(N.J. 1977).
124. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
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We see no reason why rights under the public trust doctrine to
use the upland dry sand area should be limited to municipally-
owned property. It is true that the private owner's interest in
the upland dry sand area is not identical to that of a municipal-
ity. Nonetheless, where use of dry sand is essential or reasona-
bly necessary for enjoyment of the ocean, the doctrine warrants
the public's use of the upland dry sand area subject to an ac-
commodation of the interest of the owner.125
In its decision the court disclaimed any reliance on the tradi-
tional acquisitive theories of dedication or prescription.1 26 In-
stead, it chose to ground itself squarely on a newly defined pub-
lic trust doctrine. 21 In effect the court employed a balancing
test, founded in the spirit of the existential struggle with act utili-
tarianism, that emphasized a heightened attention to the public
interest in use of property.128 Continuing to be absent in the
analysis, however, was any discussion of the stability of title in
land, the essential qualities of private ownership including the
right to exclude others, constraints upon retrospective alterations
of the definitions of land title, and any limits upon the public in-
terest in communal use of property that may be found in the
prohibitions of takings.
In sum, it might be observed that New Jersey has generally
taken a politically active and acquisitive approach to the public
trust doctrine, and the courts have responded in support. In re-
cent years, however, the effort seems to have begun to subside.
Perhaps this is in response to the backswing of the pendulum of
public opinion. For example, The New Jersey Office of the Pub-
lic Advocate, the moving force in many of the public trust cases,
125. 471 A.2d at 365.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 365-66.
128. Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (a Due Process
case balancing public and private interests). Justice Brennen in Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) purports to suggest
that the standards applied in takings cases had been the same as those
in the due process and equal protection cases. In the opinion of the
Court, Justice Scalia suggests to the contrary: "[O]ur verbal formula-
tions in the takings field have been generally quite different. We have
required that the regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state
interest' sought to be achieved, not that 'the State could rationally have
decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the States objective."
483 U.S. at 836 n.3.
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was dismantled by the Governor of the State. 129 The concentric
circles created by the impact of the New Jersey cases, however,
are still being widely felt. The decisions are frequently (although,
perhaps uncritically) cited as influential authority in definition of
the doctrine, and the offspring of the supporting cast are alive in
other jurisdictions. For example, a graduate of Rutgers Law
School recently filed suit against the City of Greenwich, Connect-
icut for having excluded him from running on the beach during
his law school years. 130
B. The Delaware View
The Public Trust Doctrine has found a respected place within
Delaware jurisprudence. While there are few reported cases, the
clear and concise explanation and application that is contained
in those that are found appears to suggest a conservative and less
judicially active approach. They claim to strike a cogent legal bal-
ance between private and public rights in property that accepts a
more traditional view of Anglo-American property law. The con-
tinuity in the synthesis of the decisions seems to support an his-
toric view of long standing policies of property law that favor sta-
bility in title. There appear to be two seminal cases, namely,
Buckson v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company3' and Groves v. Secre-
tary of the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Con-
trol.'32 Buckson concerned a dispute between the State and the
Railroad over title to a strip of land lying along the westerly
shore of the Delaware River between high and low tide. Dela-
129. The Office of the Public Advocate was dismantled by Gover-
nor Whitman in 1994 as a cost-saving measure.
130. Arthur Hayes, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL A4 (August 11, ,1997)
(Brenden Leydon, of Stamford, an attorney and former student at
Rutgers Law School, sued Greenwich, Connecticut to gain access to the
public beach). Arguments were presented before Superior Court Judge
Edward Karozon Jr. in March 1998. On July 9, 1998 the Judge found
for the Town of Greenwich, and it is evident that Mr. Leydon intends
to appeal. See Jane Doe, Judge allows restricted bench scene, THE HART-
FORD COURANT, page A3 (July 10, 1998).
131. 267 A.2d 455 (Del. 1969).
132. Groves v. Secretary of the Dep't. of Natural Resources, No.
92A-10-003, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 80, 1994 WL 89804 (Del. Super.
Feb. 8, 1994).
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ware claimed title through the grant from Penn that had been
previously affirmed in its dispute with New Jersey.'33 The Rail-
road's position was founded upon its interests as a riparian
owner. The fundamental issue was whether a riparian owner held
title to the low water mark of a navigable river. The State Su-
preme Court chose to follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court
and decided in favor of riparian ownership of the foreshore. In
so concluding it stated:
Rules of property, established by decisional law and long acqui-
esced in, may not be overthrown by the courts except for com-
pelling reasons of public policy or imperative demands of jus-
tice. . . . We find no public policy or demand of justice
requiring this Court to abandon the recognized rule of prop-
erty here under scrutiny. Indeed, if we consider the confusion
and chaotic effect upon land titles which would follow an ab-
rupt abandonment of the prevailing rule, it may be said that
public policy and the demands of justice compel preservation
of the existing rule. If there is to be a change, it must be ac-
complished by the General Assembly with due regard for the
law of eminent domain.134
In the Groves case, 13 Judge Lee, in a decision eloquent in its
simplicity and clarity, specifically reviewed the application of the
public trust doctrine in Delaware. In that case, a Ms. Mertes
owned property on the Rehoboth Bay at Delaware Beach. Her
property was located between that of Mr. Groves and the water.
Ms. Mertes and her neighbor decided to put rip-rap on their
properties to impede the erosion of the beach. The project was
to cover an area between the mean high and low tides, and since
the construction was to be on tidal lands, they were required to
obtain a permit from DENREC in accord with 7 Del. C. Section
7205(a). A permit was issued and was stated to be effective for a
period of three years. Mr. Groves had an easement from his
property to the water's edge at another location, and the pro-
posed construction would not impair that easement. It would,
however, interfere with lateral movement down the beach. 3 6 The
133. See New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934).
134. 267 A.2d at 458-59.
135. Groves v. Secretary of the Dep't. of Natural Resources, No.
92A-10-003, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 80, 1994 WL 89804 (Del. Super.
Feb. 8, 1994).
136. 7 Del. Code § 7210.
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only time that any beach was exposed at the site was at low tide.
Mr. Groves appealed the granting of the permit to the Environ-
mental Appeals Board. As part of its decision, the Board stated:
Under the public trust doctrine, the State owns the land over
which tidal waters flow and the State holds these lands in pub-
lic trust for the people, who have the right to use these lands
for navigation, fishing and other recreational uses. The genesis
of this doctrine can be traced to Roman jurisprudence. Mat-
thews v. Bay Head Improvement Assoc., 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d
355, 358-60 (NJ. Super. 1984). This doctrine grants rights to all
the people in the State; it is not limited to individuals who own
property close to the beach. 137
The Board affirmed the Secretary's decision to grant the permit
to Ms. Mertes. Mr. Groves appealed the adverse ruling. Among
his claims, Mr. Groves included that the Secretary failed to ade-
quately, consider the public interest prior to issuing the permit.
He argued, in language similar to that of the New Jersey Court,
that the public has a right of access to the foreshore on Ms.
Mertes property to walk, sunbathe, and recreate.
Citing Buckson and other relevant cases, Judge Lee concluded
on review that the rights of a riparian enure to the owner of bay
and oceanfront properties in Delaware, and a private riparian
owns to the low water mark.138 The public does possess an inter-
est in the foreshore, known under the rubric of the public trust.
The rights include the right to navigate and fish as well as a
broad State police power. The latter includes the right to protect
life, health, comfort, and property within Delaware as well as the
right to promote the public morals, safety, and welfare. In up-
holding the decision of the Secretary, the court explicitly re-
jected the authority of New Jersey's Matthews case and stated:
There does not and never has existed, as part of this doctrine
in Delaware, a right of the public superior to the landowner to
access to the foreshore for walking and/or recreational activi-
ties. The private rights of ownership may not be taken absent
some just compensation as mandated by the United States and
Delaware constitutions. If the Court or Legislature recognizes
this right of the public superior to the landowner to access to
the foreshore for walking and/or recreational activities, then
137. Groves v. Secretary of the Dep't. of Natural Resources, No.
92A-10-003, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 80, *9 1994 WL 89804 (Del. Super.
Feb. 8, 1994).
138. See id.
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the State will have to compensate the affected landowners for
the taking.139
To date, Delaware has assumed a position not unlike that re-
flected in the views of some of the early English commentators.
The jus publicum in the doctrine appears to be restricted to the
intertidal zone, and it is to serve the basic ends of navigation
and fishing. While the development of the doctrine has avoided
being overwhelmed by an analogy to the vehicle of private trans-
fer into public or charitable trust, it does seem to have come to
occupy an integrated place in the panoply of interests that a
state has in property that has been placed into the service of the
public and over which it has responsibility.
From a comparison of the two jurisdictions, it is evident that
the law of the public trust is not as uniform or as settled as some
commentators suggest. The most certain and faithful statement
one can make is that in most states, on most occasions, the pub-
lic will possess some interest in the intertidal zone that is sepa-
rate from and superior to that of private upland owners. It may
be in the form of ownership, or it may be an easement or servi-
tude. Also, private owners may, in most jurisdictions, have some
reasonable expectation that most traditional notions of property
will remain applicable to their ownership of beach property. The
property that is subject to the doctrine is, however, located on
the physical periphery of fast land. The doctrine is also located
on the conceptual periphery of legal theory. The pragmatic issue
may be whether the readjustment of the various interests will be
slow, imperceptible and rather stable, as is physical erosion or
will, like a storm, cause abrupt and evulsive changes that do vio-
lence to the legal environment. The true concerns may be the
method employecq as policy evolves and the respect that the use
of the doctrine has for other important legal policies.
III. THE TAKINGS PRINCIPLES
The perceived value of the public trust doctrine to advocates
of change has really been two fold. First, it has purported to of-
fer standing where none had previously existed. Citizens, as ben-
eficiaries of the trust, have in many jurisdictions been able to
challenge the government with respect to its actions. 140 Second,
139. Id. at *18-19.
140. See supra note 4 (denoting the doctrine as an instrument of
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and perhaps an elusive artifice, courts and commentators have
posited that the doctrine is a legal refuge from the effects and
application of the federal takings principles. 41 The reasoning as-
serts that insofar as government possesses an emblement of title,
its assertion of control is not in derogation of a private owner-
ship interest. The latter position has been constructed in re-
sponse to the concerns of some that liberating a public interest
in beach access through use of state regulation under the police
power has been curtailed by recent takings cases such as Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal CounciP42 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.143
These advocates may, however, have failed to perceive the
broader warnings found in the cases. Instead, they have contin-
ued to view the law of the case as a literal and fully directive and
definitive sanctuary possessed of an unrealistic and contrived
clarity. However, if law is truly so malleable that it can be bent to
the will of one, it may also spring to the service of another.
Therefore, it is really the frequency and amplitude of the oscilla-
tion between opposing interests that should be scrutinized. As a
democratization). In most jurisdictions it is the Attorney General or an-
other designated public official who possesses standing to enforce a
public or charitable trust. A suit may be brought by the official or on
the relation of a third party. See Wilmington v. Lord, 378 A.2d 635 (Del.
1977). In addition, persons having a special interest in the enforcement
of the trust have been permitted standing. See Jersey City v. N.J. Dep't
of Envtl. Protection, 545 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1988). In general, however, "a
third person who has no special interest cannot himself maintain the
suit. If a third person were permitted to sue as a matter of right it
would be possible to subject the charity to harassing litigation." AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, IVA THE LAW OF TRUSTS
section 391, page 373 (4th ed. 1989). In some situations classes of indi-
viduals have been denied standing. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). In other circumstances classes have been per-
mitted standing. SeeJones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210 (Ala. 1977). Finally,
a small number of states have permitted individuals to sue to enforce a
public trust. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Court of Alpine Cty,
658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). See also Napeahi v. Paty, 921 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1990).
141. See ARCHER, supra note 4; see also Slade, supra note 4.
142. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
143. See supra note 10..
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result we will now turn to a review of several of the most relevant
decisions and attempt to disclose their germaine meaning.
The United States Supreme Court has observed that the just
compensation clause "was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be bourne by the .public as a
whole." 144 It has also observed that "[a] ccordingly, one of the
central concerns of our takings jurisprudence is 'prevent[ing]
the public from loading upon one individual more than his
share of the burdens of government.' "145
A closer look at Lucas146 and other decisions may suggest, how-
ever, that placing a substantial degree of confidence in the pub-
lic trust doctrine is ill-considered. Perhaps Lucas even suggests
that a high degree of confidence in any legal conclusion is
unwarranted.
The Lucas case 14 considered the effect of the state Beachfront
Management Act, which barred Lucas from erecting any perma-
144. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also
Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 837; Lunney, supra note 8. For an excellent arti-
cle providing an overview of takings and recent legislation see Leslie
M. MacRae, The Regulatory Takings Bill: A Cure With Unintended Side Ef-
fects, 5 Dicy- J. ENVTL. L. & POLICY 57 (1996).
145. 505 U.S. at 1071-72 (dissenting opinion by Justice Blackman)
(quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U.S., 148 U.S. 312, 325
(1893)). See also the dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
The distinction drawn in these examples . . . relates directly
to whether an individual is being singled out 'to assume the
cost of a benefit conferred on others without the hope for
recoupment of the cost.' Dunham faulted such impositions
as being contrary to statutory and common-law principles
from 'time immemorial.' Moreover, such impositions defeat
the democratic process by concealing the true cost of public
benefits and avoiding tax and spending mechanisms that
would allow for a better approximation of an 'equal sharing
of cost or of sharing according to capacity to pay.'
Kmiec, supra note 7, at 1637 (quoting Dunham, A Legal and Economic Ba-
sis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650 (1958)); see also Keystone Bi-
tuminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
146. See supra note 3.
147. See id.
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nent habitable structure on his lots. The Court held that the en-
forcement of certain coastal regulations may be considered a tak-
ing if it deprives a person of all economically beneficial use of
the land. More generally, the holding may have been a sugges-
tion to the government that it should not move too quickly and
advance too far in the evolution of its definition of property.
It may be important to note that Justice Scalia authored the
majority's opinion in Lucas. In the course of his opinion, Scalia
presented a summary of takings jurisprudence. He noted that
prior to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,148 it was believed that tak-
ings required a direct appropriation:
Justice Holmes recognized in Mahon, however, that if the pro-
tection against physical appropriations of private property was
to be meaningfully enforced, the government's power to rede-
fine the range of interests included in the ownership of prop-
erty was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits. 260
U.S., at 414-415. If, instead, the uses of private property were
subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the
police power, 'the natural tendency of human nature [would
be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last pri-
vate property disappear[ed] '.149
Scalia identified two discrete categories of action as compensa-
ble. The first would compel an owner to suffer a physical inva-
sion at the behest of the public. With respect to this class, he
stated: "In general (at least with regard to permanent invasions),
no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty
the public purpose behind it, we have required compensa-
tion." 150 Justice Scalia pointed to the Court's decision in Loretto v.
148. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
149. 505 U.S. at 1014.
150. Id. at 1015. See also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 ("Had California
simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beach-
front available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase
public access to the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to re-
build their house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there
would have been a taking."); Dolan, supra note 10, at 384 ("Without
question, had the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of
land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the
grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a
taking would have occurred.").
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Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation1 51 as authority. In that
case it was determined that a New York regulation that required
landlords to allow cable companies to place cable facilities in
their apartments constituted a taking even though the space
taken was only 1.5 cubic feet. 52
The second category, the one at particular issue in Lucas, is
where a regulation denies all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of land. The Coastal Council -advocated the position in
Lucas that title to property was somehow impressed with an in-
choate limitation that permitted the state to limit its value with
apparent impunity. The Court concluded that this view was in-
consistent with the historical compact that the government had
151. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). See also the opinion of the Court by jus-
tice Scalia in Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
152. See Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (1982). A physical taking appears as
a seminal principle in takings theory. See Lunney, supra note 8 at 1896
(listing a number of authorities that support the proposition); see also
Kmiec, supra note 7, at 1649 ("Prior to Nollan, it, was reasonably clear
that a permanent physical occupation was a per se taking. After Nollan
... even this minimal protection from governmental intrusion is not
absolutely precluded, but only subject to a less protective 'means-ends'
scrutiny. As Michelman suggests, the Court deliberately chooses not to
go down the Loretto path to invalidate the easement condition as an im-
permissible physical invasion." (citations omitted)). However, Justice
Scalia in his opinion in Nollan states:
Had California simply required the Nollans to make an ease-
ment across their beachfront available to the public on a
permanent basis in order to increase public access to the
beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their
house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there
would have been a taking. To say that the appropriation of a
public easement across a landowner's premises does not con-
stitute the taking of property but rather . . . [is] "a mere re-
striction on its use" . . . is to use words in a manner that de-
prives them of all their ordinary meaning. Indeed, one of
the principle uses of the eminent domain power is to assure
that the government be able to require conveyance of just
such interests, so long as it pays for them. . . . We have re-
peatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for
private use, "the right to exclude [others is] 'one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are com-
monly characterized as property.' "
483 U.S. at 831. (Citations omitted).
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with its citizens as found in the Takings Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution. It stated:
Where "permanent physical occupation" of land is concerned,
we have refused to allow the government to decree it anew
(without compensation), no matter how weighty the asserted
"Public interests" involved, Loretto v. Teleprompter, 458 U.S. at
426 -though we assuredly would permit the government to assert
a permanent easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon
the landowner's title. Compare Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S.
141, 163 (1900) (interests of "riparian owner in the submerged
lands . . . bordering on a public navigable water" held subject
to Government's navigational servitude), with Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. at 178-80 (imposition of navigational
servitude on marina created and rendered navigable at private
expense held to constitute a taking). We believe similar treat-
ment must be accorded confiscatory regulations, i.e., regula-
tions that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land: Any
limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A
law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved
in the courts -by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely af-
fected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by
the State itself under its complementary power to abate nui-
sances that affect the public generally, or otherwise. 15 3
Later courts have relied upon this particular language as they
purport to discover the avenue of application of the long forgot-
ten or overlooked doctrine of the Public Trust. The theory em-
ployed in this service seems to be that by retrospectively refining
(some would suggest redefining) title, the manifest change in
use would fall within the noted exception to the takings theory.
This may, however, prove to be a far too mechanical reading of
the language and one that lacks genetic context.
Perhaps the goals of the polity would be better served if less
reliance were placed upon social desires and contrived advocacy
and more attention were given to reassessing the allocation of
public energies and persuasively changing underlying centripetal
attitudes. One obvious choice would be to consider that, if the
public feels it has a need for a resource, it should compose a
153. 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992).
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means by which to set aside assets to purchase it. It should not
merely redefine the rules by which the game is played.
154
The pragmatic risk of a redefinitional approach may be better
assessed in Constitutional terms if one's attention is drawn to Jus-
tice Scalia's dissenting opinion in the post-Lucas case, Stevens v.
Cannon Beach.155 The petitioners in that dispute brought a suit
against the City of Cannon in inverse condemnation. A taking in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was alleged.
The Stevens had sought a building permit for construction of a
seawall on the dry sand area of property they purchased in 1957.
The trial court dismissed their suit for failing to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, and concluded that the Ste-
vens never possessed the right to obstruct the dry sand portion
of the property. The decision was sustained on appeal to the Or-
egon Supreme Court; the conclusion being founded upon the
precedent of State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay' 56 The petitioners ap-
pealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and certiorari was denied,
with Mr. Justice Scalia dissenting.
In order to comprehend Justice Scalia's reservations, it is im-
portant to note that in Thornton, the State of Oregon initiated
suit to enjoin the owners of certain beachfront tourist facilities
from building on the dry sand area. The State presented its case
upon the alternative theories of implied dedication and prescrip-
tive easement. It argued that by these well-known principles of
property, the public had acquired the right to use the dry sand
for recreation. The Oregon Supreme Court, however, in af-
firming the grant of an injunction against the property owners,
relied upon a different theory. It stated:
The most cogent basis for the decision in this case is the En-
glish doctrine of custom. Strictly construed, prescription applies
only to the specific tract of land before the court, and doubtful
prescription cases could fill the courts for years with tract-by-
tract litigation. An established custom, on the other hand, can
be proven with reference to a larger region. Ocean-front lands
from the northern to the southern border of the state ought to
154. "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
155. 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).
156. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
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be treated uniformly. 57
After setting forth the elements of custom, 58 the court sustained
the injunction stating that "it takes from no man anything which
he had a legitimate right to regard as his. 159
In 1989, however, the Supreme Court of Oregon revisited the
issue of public access to the dry sand beach in McDonald v. Hal-
vorson.160 In McDonald, the plaintiffs sought a declaration specify-
ing that certain dry sand beaches belonging to the defendant
and adjacent to a cove on the Pacific Ocean were accessible to
them as members of the public. The Court held that the public
had no right to recreational use of the dry sand area in dispute.
It observed that there was an absence of testimony demonstrat-
ing customary use of the cove beach, and as a result, determined
that there was no factual predicate upon which to ground the
application of the doctrine of custom. The Court reasoned that
nothing in Thornton should be read as having established an un-
disputable public claim to recreational use of the entire Oregon
coast.
157. See id. at 676.
158. See id. Sir William Blackstone set out the requisites of custom,
as paraphrased by the Thornton Court, in his treatise as follows:
[T]he first requirement of a custom, to be recognized as law,'
is that it must be ancient. It must have been used so long
'that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary' ....
The second requirement is that the right be exercised with-
out interruption. A customary right need not be exercised
continuously, but it must be exercised without an interrup-
tion caused by anyone possessing a paramount right ....
Blackstone's third requirement (is) that the customary use
be peaceable and free from dispute. The fourth require-
ment, that of reasonableness, is satisfied by the evidence that
the public has always made use of the land in a manner ap-
propriate to the land and to the usages of the commu-
nity . . . .The fifth requirement, certainty, is satisfied by the
visible boundaries of the dry-sand area and by the character
of the land . . . .The Sixth requirement is that a custom
must be obligatory; that is .. .not left to the option of each
landowner .... Finally, a custom must not be repugnant, or
inconsistent, with other customs or with other law.
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 75-78.
159. See 462 P.2d at 678.
160. See 780 P.2d 714 (Or. 1989).
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Justice Scalia noted that the trial court in Cannon Beach failed
to acknowledge the McDonald decision and that the appellate
courts declined to permit the petitioners to present factual mate-
rial that could have demonstrated that the doctrine of custom
should not have been applied. Instead, the Supreme Court of
Oregon reverted to quoting the sweeping language of Thornton
to the effect that the doctrine applied to all of the Oregon
shore, and stated that the doctrine was just such a background
principle of Oregon law as was anticipated and required by Lu-
cas. 61 Therefore, the Oregon Court concluded that petitioners
never had a claim to the dry sand area.1 62
While acknowledging that this case was decided upon a mo-
tion to dismiss and that the lack of an adequate factual record
may have placed review beyond the actual power of the federal
court, Scalia stated that "to say that the case raises serious Fifth
Amendment takings issues is an understatement."'' 63 While ac-
knowledging that the Constitution does leave the development of
property law to the States, they may not deny the rights pro-
tected under the Constitution "by invoking nonexistent rules of
substantive law."' 64 Scalia continues:
Our opinion in Lucas, for example, would be a nullity if any-
thing that a State court chooses to denominate "background
law" -regardless of whether it really is such -could eliminate
property rights .... No more by judicial decree than by legisla-
tive fiat may a State transform private property into public
property without compensation. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980). 165
In so opining, Justice Scalia favorably cited an often over-
looked view of Justice Stewart as communicated in Hughes v.
Washington. 66 In that case, the State of Washington had disputed
the ownership of accretions to oceanfront land owned by Mrs.
Hughes. The State's claim was based upon the State Constitution
161. See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1210
(1994).
162. See id. at 1207.
163. Id. at 1212; see also 510 U.S. at 1335 ("The issue is serious in
the sense that it involves a holding of questionable constitutionality;
and it is serious in the sense that the land-grab (if there is one) may
run the entire length of the Oregon coast.").
164. Id. at 1211.
165. Id. at 1211-1212.
166. 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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of 1889 that set ownership of the foreshore in the State to the
high water mark as of that date. Mrs. Hughes claimed title to her
property as the successor to a federal grant. Federal law awarded
accretions to the riparian owner. The issue was whether state or
federal law governed the ownership of the added dry sand area.
The Supreme Court, through Justice Black, concluded that fed-
eral law applied to federal grants and that, therefore, Mrs.
Hughes was the owner of accretions to her property. In a concur-
ring opinion Mr. Justice Stewart presented a perspective that was
incorporated into the Lucas decision, in part, and that was cited
explicitly and favorably by Justice Scalia in his opinion in the
Cannon Beach case. The most relevant portions of Justice Stew-
art's comments are, as follows:
Surely it must be conceded as a general proposition that the
law of real property is, under our Constitution, left to the indi-
vidual States to develop and administer. And surely Washington
or any other State is free to make changes, either legislative or
judicial, in its general rules of real property law, including the
rules governing the property rights of riparian owners . ...
Like any other property owner, however, Mrs. Hughes may in-
sist, quite apart from the federal origin of her title, that the
State not take her land without just compensation.
To the extent that the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Washington . . . arguably conforms to reasonable expectations,
we must of course accept it as conclusive. But to the extent that
it constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in
terms of the relevant precedents, no such deference would be
appropriate. For a State cannot be permitted to defeat the con-
stitutional prohibition against taking property without due pro-
cess of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that
the property it has taken never existed at all.
Of course the court did not conceive of this action as a tak-
ing. As is so often the case when a State exercises its power to
make law, or to regulate, or to pursue a public project, pre-
existing property interests were impaired here without any cal-
culated decision to deprive anyone of what he once owned. But
the Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a
State says, or what it intends, but by what it does. Although the
State in this case made no attempt to take,the accreted lands
by eminent domain, it achieved the same result by effecting a
retroactive transformation of private into public property
without paying for the privilege of doing so.167
167. Id. at 295-98.
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Therefore, before advocates set forth in the lifeboat of the
language of Lucas on a presumed course toward a safe harbor
for public interest, they may want to note that their vessel may
not be as seaworthy as they might have assumed. Upon closer in-
spection they may, in fact, observe the fluid waters of the takings
theory puddling at their feet. While the various Supreme Court
opinions in recent cases offer diverse perspectives in takings the-
ory, one element is, however, becoming clearer. Courts and legis-
latures might be advised to tread more cautiously as they forge
the devices of securing the public interest at the expense of indi-
vidual interests. As Justice Kennedy observed of the application
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in his concurring opin-
ion in Lucas-
There is an inherent tendency toward circularity in this synthe-
sis, of course; for if the owner's reasonable expectations are
shaped by what the courts allow as a proper exercise of govern-
mental authority, property tends to become what courts say it
is. Some circularity must be tolerated in there matters, however,
as it is in other spheres .... The definition, moreover, is not
circular in its entirety. The expectations protected by the Con-
stitution are based on objective rules and customs that can be
understood as reasonable by all parties involved. 61
IV. FAIRNESS IN RETROSPECTIVE DECISION-MAING
The specter of retrospective judicial action may be most dis-
turbing to persons adversely affected by the application of the
public trust doctrine. Many had thought they had protected own-
ership interests in coastal property. Most were surprised to learn
that, at least in some circumstances, they did not own as much as
they had believed. As a result, two questions, in addition to those
previously discussed, have been raised in those circumstances
when courts appear to have altered prior trends in decision-
making by invoking the public trust doctrine. Unfortunately, the
questions are rarely, if ever, addressed by those courts except in
oblique ways. The first is whether decisions that readjust devel-
oped expectations about property should be made retroactive. 169
The second is whether there is truly an adequate precedent to
168. 505 U.S. 1003, 1034-35 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169. See, e.g., Neptune v. Avon by the Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J.
1972).
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justify the retroactive effect of adjudication in these
circumstances.
One of the measures of an innovative judicial decision may be
its success in balancing the varying and sometimes competing
principles of continuity and evolution. The justice of the end
should, at least in part, be judged in terms of whether the means
employed in reaching the result are appropriate and fair. Certain
standards used to evaluate the means by which law impacts
events or actors have developed under the rubric of prospective
and retrospective activity. This is of particular relevance to the
public trust analysis so as to appreciate a meaning of the Lucas
decision within the broader jurisprudence of Justice Scalia.
Therefore, in order to properly assess the quality of past public
trust decisions as well as consider the future direction of the doc-
trine, it might be appropriate to briefly review these principles.
A. The Nature of Judicial and Legislative Action
First, in order to compose a proper response to the initial in-
quiry, it might be appropriate to note that our basic jurispru-
dence has, in this regard, distinguished between adjudicative and
legislative decision-making. While the Supreme Court has noted
that the distinction should be known even to law students, it
may, in fact, be an explication that is oft neglected and rarely ar-
ticulated. 170 In sum, judicial decisions are, by their nature, retro-
spective, and legislative standards are to be prospective. While
this may be clouded by judicial opinions that contain suggestions
about the direction which developing law should take or by judi-
cially active attempts to make decisions prospective in effect, a
court's responsibility usually arises upon a case or controversy,
acts upon past facts, and pointedly affects the persons before the
court. Legislation, to the contrary, is generally prospective in ap-
plication, considers policy, and has general applicability to any-
one in the affected class to which the statute might apply.171
170. See United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79
(1982); see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311-12
(1994).
171. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908)
("A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they
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Second, the Constitution places certain limits upon retroactiv-
ity. For example:
The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits retroactive application
of penal legislation. Article I, Section 10. Cl. 1 prohibits States
from passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws impair-
ing the Obligation of Contracts. The Fifth Amendment's Tak-
ings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other government ac-
tors) from depriving persons of vested property rights except
for a "public use" and upon payment of "just compensation."
The prohibition on "Bills of Attainder" in Art. I Sections 9-10,
prohibits legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and
meeting out summary punishments for past conduct. The Due
Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and re-
stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed to already ex-
ist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to
the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be
applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power");
see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) ("First it is a well
settled principle that this Court adjudicates only 'cases' and 'controver-
sies.' Unlike a legislature we do not promulgate new rules . .. on a
broad basis. Rather, the nature of judicial review requires that we adju-
dicate specific cases, and each case usually becomes the vehicle for an-
nouncement of a new rule");
Where those principles and precedents antedate the events
on which the dispute turns, the court merely applies legal
rules already decided, and the litigant has no basis on which
to claim exemption from those rules. It is only when the law
changes in some respect that an assertion of nonretroactivity
may be entertained, the paradigm case arising when a court
expressly overrules a precedent upon which the contest
would otherwise be decided differently and by which the par-
ties may previously have regulated their conduct. Since the
question is whether the court should apply the old rule or
the new one, retroactivity is improperly seen in the first in-
stance as a matter of choice of law, "a choice . ..between
the principle of forward operation and that of relation
backward."
501 U.S. 529 (1991); but cf. Harper v. Virginia, infra note 200 and ac-
companying text (banning selective application of new rules); JOHN
DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 17-20
(1927); Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARv.
L. REV. 259 (1938); Frederick Schauer, A Brief Note on the Logic of Rules,
42 ADMIN. L. REV. 447, 454 (1990) (with special reference to Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988)).
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pose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation; a justi-
fication sufficient to invalidate a statute's prospective applica-
tion under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its
retroactive application.172
1. The Legislative Standard
For a considerable time, the general view was that there was to
be no retroactivity to legislative rules.'73 The Court did, however,
struggle with applying legislation retroactively in select cases. For
example, in circumstances where the negative effects were solely
economic, some retrospectivity had been permitted. 174 The re-
172. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994).
173. See Kaiser Aluminum v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990)
(Justice Scalia expressing very strong views on the separation of powers
issues and on the fairness in the method of changing a trend in the
law).
174. The Court has customarily tolerated a modicum of retroactiv-
ity in such areas as taxation. In United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26
(1994), the Court reviewed a December 1987 amendment to the Inter-
nal Revenue Estate and Gift Code which was made retroactive to Octo-
ber 1986, the date of a prior amendment. Relying upon the 1986 Code,
Respondent engaged in a stock purchase and sale consistent with its
provisions in December 1986. The Court concluded that the 1987
amendment's retroactive effect did not violate Due Process. In the
course of the opinion and noting that much tax legislation has been
retrospective Justice Blackmun, quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976) stated:
This Court repeatedly has upheld retroactive tax legislation
against a due process challenge. Some of its decisions have
stated that the validity of a retroactive tax provision under
the Due Process Clause depends upon whether "retroactive
application is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the
constitutional limitation." The "harsh and oppressive" formu-
lation, however, "does not differ from the prohibition against
arbitrary and irrational legislation" that applies generally to
enactments in the sphere of economic policy. The due pro-
cess standard to be applied to tax statutes with retroactive ef-
fect, therefore, is the same as that generally applicable to ret-
roactive legislation:
"Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is
supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered
by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such
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cent case of Landsgraf v. USI Film Products175 presents the current
statement on the subject. Landsgraf involved a sexual harassment
claim under an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. In order to resolve the issue, the Court had to consider
two contradictory canons of statutory interpretation, i.e., the rule
stated in Bradley v. City of Richmond176 that the court must apply
the law in effect at the time of its decision and the sometimes
opposing axiom, found in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospi-
taP77 that statutory retroactivity is not favored.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, attempted to reconcile
these ofttimes competing values. First, he observed that the
Court has consistently declined to give retroactive effect to legis-
lation that burdens private rights unless Congress has clearly
evinced such an intention. 17 Even when legislative intent is ex-
plicit, however, there is a presumption against retroactive legisla-
legislation remain within the exclusive province of the
legislative and executive branches .... " 512 U.S. at 30-
31 (citations omitted).
In a concurring opinion Justice Scalia commented upon the Court's
view of substantive due process in this case.
I cannot avoid observing, however, two stark discrepancies
between today's due process reasoning and the due process
reasoning the Court applies to its identification of new so-
called fundamental rights, such as the right to structure fam-
ily living arrangements, and the right to an abortion. First
and most obviously, where respondent's claimed right to
hold onto his property is at issue, the Court upholds the tax
amendment because it rationally furthers a legitimate inter-
est; whereas when other claimed rights that the Court deems
fundamental are at issue, the Court strikes down laws that
concededly promote legitimate interests. . . .The picking
and choosing among various rights to be accorded "substan-
tive due process" protection is alone enough to arouse suspi-
cion; but the categorical and inexplicit exclusion of so-called
"economic rights" (even though the Due Process Clause ex-
plicitly applies to "property") unquestionably involves poli-
cymaking rather than neutral legal analysis.
512 U.S. at 40-42 (Scalia concurring).
175. See 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
176. 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
177. 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
178. See id. at 258.
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tion that is deeply rooted in our tradition. 17 9 "Elementary consid-
erations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their con-
duct accordingly."'' 80 Second, he noted that while there are Con-
stitutional limitations upon retroactivity, the restrictions do have
limits. Absent a violation of one of the specific Constitutional
provisions, the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation
is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its in-
tended effect. "Retroactivity provisions often serve entirely be-
nign and legitimate purposes . "... ,181 Third, and of particular
import in the context of the public trust doctrine, he observed:
"The largest category of cases in which we have applied the pre-
sumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new provi-
sions affecting contractual or property rights, matters in which
predictability are of prime importance."'' 8 2 Finally, if the legisla-
tive intention is not clear, the Justice concluded that the pre-
sumption against retroactivity should prevail except in certain
limited circumstances. These are: 1. When the new provision
only affects the propriety of prospective relief; 2. When the stat-
ute confers or ousts judicial jurisdiction; and 3. When the
change is to procedural rules. 8 3 In sum, the Landsgraf decision
appears to support the historic axiom that legislation is, gener-
ally, to be prospective and general in effect.
2. The Judicial Standard
The judicial restraints, however, have been more elusive to
identify. The nature of the legal process and the ideals of stabil-
ity and predictability compete very heavily with the evolution of
principle in response to changing conditions. For example, in
the case of first impression a court may reference a developed
customary social resolution, not previously specifically institution-
alized, and invoke it in the course of its decision. The most
179. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 258 (1994).
180. 511 U.S. at 264.
181. 511 U.S. at 267-8.
182. 511 U.S. at 271. See also United States v. Security Industrial
Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982).
183. 511 U.S. at 280-83.
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troubling paradigm, however, may be in circumstances when
courts have previously addressed an issue and set standards but
where either circumstances or policies have become altered over
time and call for dramatic reconsideration.
The concerns are generally three fold: 1. Should a judicial de-
cision alter a developed trend in stare decisis, and if so, what are
the proper precedential limits when persons have invested in an
established state of affairs in reliance upon the existing standard?
2. Should a judicial decision that sets forth a new rule be bind-
ing upon any or all other pending cases notwithstanding that the
parties in those other cases could not have known of the deci-
sion before they acted? This consideration has been labeled se-
lective prospectivity. 3. May a new rule of law be authoritatively
set forth in a judicial decision yet not be applied to the parties
before the court? This has been labeled as pure prospectivity.
The first question is a mere restatement of one that was posed
above, and it will be addressed in the next section of the Article.
The latter questions relate to the nature of the judicial process,
and a discussion of these follows immediately.
The subject of judicial retroactivity, originally, had different
considerations depending upon whether the issue fell within the
realm of criminal or civil law, however, the courts employed a
balancing approach in each. In 1965 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue in the context of a criminal conviction in Lin-
kletter v. Walker.184 It held that a court had discretion in determin-
ing if a decision setting a criminal precedent should be applied
retrospectively, and in the course of the opinion the Court set
forth certain standards that should be applied in making the de-
termination. 185 The standards included: 1. the purpose of the
new rule, 2. the reliance placed upon the purpose of the old
rule and 3. the effect upon the administration of justice of a ret-
roactive application of a new rule.
In 1971 in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 86 the Court adopted a sim-
ilar discretionary position with respect to civil cases and again set
forth appropriate factors that might be taken into consideration.
184. 381. U.S. 618 (1965).
185. 381 U.S. at 629.
186. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
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First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish
a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past prece-
dent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue
of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshad-
owed. Second, it has been stressed that "we must ... weigh the
merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history
of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether ret-
rospective operation will further or retard its operation." Fi-
nally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retrospective
application .... 187
In 1987 the trend was qualified. In Griffith v. Kentucky,'8 8 the
Court altered its course in the criminal area and overruled Lin-
kletter.189 The Court concluded first that it would be improper
and unfair if standards applied to one individual were not ap-
plied to all, and second that determining the timing of the appli-
cation of a new constitutional principle was essentially legislative,
not judicial, in character. 190 Griffith clearly indicated that the
Court did not intend to alter the civil rule,' 91 and that such cases
would continue to be governed by Chevron.
American Trucking Association, Inc. v. Smith,192 a 5-4 decision, re-
affirmed the balancing test for civil actions. Justice O'Connor
writing for a plurality of the Court, declined to extend the poli-
cies of the Griffith holding to civil cases. Choosing to continue to
apply the Chevron principles, the Court concluded that applica-
tion of a prior decision invalidating certain taxes would place too
great a burden upon the state if applied retroactively. 93 Justice
Scalia concurred in the result in American Trucking and provided
the fifth vote. However, he rejected the discretionary retroactivity
position of the plurality. Scalia explicitly asserted the conclusion
that prospective adjudication is incompatible with the judicial
role. 194
Support for the balancing method as applied to permit civil
prospectivity began to erode the following year. The views of the
individual justices began to refine. In James B. Beam Distilling Co.
187. 404 U.S. at 106-07 (citation omitted).
188. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
189. 381 U.S. 618.
190. 479 U.S. at 322-23.
191. 479 U.S. at 328.
192. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
193. 496 U.S. at 182-83.
194. 496 U.S. at 201.
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v. Georgia,195 the Court considered the principle of selective pros-
pectivity. [This theorem had permitted courts to apply a new
rule to the litigants but to decline to make it retroactive to
others.] The Court, through an opinion by Justice Souter, held
that once a new rule is applied to one litigant it must be applied
to all others who are similarly situated. 196 There was, however, no
consensus as to the reasons for the rule. There were, in fact, five
separate opinions written in the case. Justice Souter writing for
the Court expressly rejected the principle of selective prospectiv-
ity and stated that differential treatment of similarly situated liti-
gants was impermissible. 97 "Griffith cannot be confined to crimi-
nal law. Its equality principle . . .carries comparable force in the
civil context."' 98 Justice Souter explicitly stated that he did not
address pure prospectivity. 99 However, Justice Scalia again prof-
fered that organic principles of the separation of powers ren-
dered prospective adjudication unconstitutional.
If the division of federal powers central to the constitutional
scheme is to succeed in its objective, it seems to me that the
fundamental nature of those powers must be preserved as that
nature was understood when the Constitution was enacted ....
I think, "[t] he judicial Power of the United States" . . . must be
deemed to be the judicial power as understood by our com-
mon-law tradition. That is the power "to say what the law is,"
not the power to change it. I am not so naive (nor do I think
our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real
sense "make" law. But they make it as judges make it ... which
is to say as though they were "finding" it -discerning what the
law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what
it will tomorrow be .... For this reason, and not reasons of eq-
uity, I would find both "selective prospectivity" and "pure pros-
pectivity" beyond our power.z°°
Blackmun agreed with Scalia's conclusion but based his deci-
sion upon the case or controversy requirement of Article 111.201
In dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Kennedy, supported the continued use of the discre-
195. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
196. 501 U.S. at 540-44.
197. 501 U.S. at 540.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 544.
200. 501 U.S. at 549 (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted).
201. 501 U.S. at 547.
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tionary test as set forth in Chevron.20 2
Finally, in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,20 3 the Jus-
tices appeared to coalesce into a majority, applying a rule similar
to that found in Griffith. Adjudication was determined to be es-
sentially retrospective in character. Writing for the Court, Justice
Thomas stated:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still
open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of
the rule. This rule extends Griffith's ban against "selective appli-
cation of new rules.2°4
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia characterized the political
tone of attempts at prospective adjudication:
Prospective decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activ-
ism, and the born enemy of stare decisis. It was formulated in
the heyday of legal realism and promoted as a "techniqu[e] of
judicial lawmaking" in general, and more specifically as a
means of making it easier to overrule prior precedent.25
The true traditional view is that prospective decisionmaking is
quite incompatible with the judicial power, and that courts
have no authority to engage in the practice. °6
Therefore, it is possible to fashion a reasonable response to
the latter questions posed in this section. The legislative process
is probably the preferred vehicle to be used to set future policy
for the public trust. If, however, a court chooses to act in the
area, it is proper to assume that whatever its decision, it would
be applicable to the parties before it and would have serious im-
plications to others having a similar status. Consequently, to the
extent that the judiciary alters past trends through its actions,
due attention must be afforded to the policies of stare decisis.
B. Stare Decisis
Because the historical perspective that judicial decisions are es-
sentially retroactive seems to have been reconfirmed, the ques-
202. 501 U.S. at 549-59.
203. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
204. 509 U.S. at 97.
205. 509 U.S. at 105 (citation omitted).
206. Id. at 106.
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tion is raised as to the standards that courts should apply when
upsetting established expectations. As Justice Souter noted in the
Beam case:
In the ordinary case, no question of retroactivity arises. Courts
are as a general matter in the business of applying settled prin-
ciples and precedents of law to disputes that come to the bar.
Where those principles and precedents antedate the events on
which the dispute turns, the court merely applies legal rules al-
ready decided, and the litigant has no basis on which to claim
exemption from those rules.
It is only when the law changes in some respect that an asser-
tion of nonretroactivity may be entertained, the paradigm case
arising when a court expressly overrules a precedent upon
which the contest would otherwise be decided differently and
by which the parties may previously have regulated their
conduct.207
As a result of many of the public trust decisions, numerous
confidences and assurances in title to property have been under-
mined or qualified. Therefore, the second issue to be raised is
under what circumstances should a court alter prior judicial
trends, and what are the standards it should apply in that exer-
cise of judicial discretion. Justice O'Connor has provided some
cogent insight into the apposite principles in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey:
The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a
contrary necessity marks its outer limit. With Cardozo, we rec-
ognize that no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed
each issue afresh in every case that raised it. Indeed, the very
concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution re-
quires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is,
by definition, indispensable. At the other extreme, a different
necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should
come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for
that very reason doomed.
Even when the decision to overrule a prior case is not, as in
the rare, latter instance, virtually foreordained, it is common
wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an "inexorable com-
mand," and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case.
Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judg-
ment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and
pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of
207. 501 U.S. at 534.
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overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law,
and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling
a prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule
has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical worka-
bility; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that
would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overrul-
ing and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether re-
lated principles of law have so far developed as to have left the
old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or
whether facts have so changed or come to be seen so differ-
enfly, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application
or justification. 20 1
Whether the theory of title espoused by the public trust doc-
trine has been newly constructed or newly discovered, it seems
that in many circumstances the judicial announcement recogniz-
ing the nascent principles has come as a legitimate shock to
landowners. In those cases that have relied upon such settled
principles of law as easement and dedication and have taken the
time to muster the evidence necessary to support the ultimate
conclusion that the public does possess a certain interest within
the bounds of established theory, the traditions of the legal pro-
cess are supported. It does not matter that the anguished cries of
those individually injured can be heard. At least the means and
principles by which their interests were altered were considered
as a part of the decision-making structure with which they had
become accustomed. However, in those cases at the margin of
the legal process, where the courts have relied upon a changing
judicial horizon to newly declare what purports to be old but un-
discovered principles, or to expand an older doctrine that had
been confined to one geomorphological area to include another,
one must seriously question the action. This is particularly true
where the arena is further circumscribed by a counter-opposing
principle such as the constitutional takings provisions. In this sit-
uation, the decisions speak less of the voice of the legal system
providing order to the lives of sovereign community members
and more of the political questions and unrest at the foundation
of the decision-making system itself. This is not to suggest that
the law should fail to evolve. It is to proffer that if judicial
changes alter significant interests in property, the public fisc
should be prepared to accept a part of the burden.
208. 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citations omitted).
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V. A CONCLUSION AND WARNING TO ENVIRONMENTALISTS
Eventually everybody wants something, and the goal is, for the
sake of psychosocial integration, often characterized as striving to
leave everyone in an improved condition. At least it is assumed
that no one is left in a worse position. Achieving results, how-
ever, requires competition with others who frequently see the
proposed end in less desirable ways. It is not unusual that feel-
ings of entitlement on each side build, causing proponents to be-
lieve it logical and also just that they prevail. So it has been in
the debate over the public trust. Public advocates, as well as
those who resist, struggle to cast their arguments to fit the legal
jargon which clothes seemingly acceptable behavior. It is not
likely, however, that both can actually wear the same garment. A
responsible and respectable resolution will require alteration and
adjustment or else the dress will tear. The more dramatic the
change, however, the more vulnerable the resulting style
becomes.
Environmentalists have exhibited great excitement over the ad-
vances of their interests through the public trust. Many, particu-
larly those who are not legally trained, celebrate their victories as
though they have liberated universal truths and cry out for more
change. They may, in their zeal, reverence, and hopeful inno-
cence, however, have overestimated the stability of their claimed
victory. They fail to consider that, like the fated regulation in the
Lucas case, the reconstitution of the public trust doctrine may be
vulnerable to the same political forces through which it found
expression. There is a distinction to be made between evolution-
ary development and revolutionary change. At the least, the prin-
ciples raise questions concerning the functioning of a legal sys-
tem and the proper balancing of the mechanisms of growth.
They also raise questions of who should bear the costs of the
growth.
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